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ABSTRACT 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF  
INTERNATIONAL AND STATE LEVEL RESPONSES TO REFUGEE CRISES: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF  
SYRIA (2011-2016) AND RWANDA (1990-1994)  
 
SEVDENUR KÖSE 
 
Political Science, M.A. Thesis, 2016 
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Keywords: refugee crisis, state, international organization, NGO, Syria, Rwanda 
This thesis explores the determinants of responses by various actors to massive migration 
as a result of civil wars. The main claim is that certain characteristics of an armed civil 
conflict have determining influence on actors’ attitude towards refugee crises that arises 
with civil wars. The thesis proposes that the characteristics of conflict such as geographical 
proximity of the conflict, refugee type and profile, the foreign policy positioning of the 
sender country have a significant impact on the actors’ responses to refugee crises. The 
international actors are examined in two categories: intergovernmental organizations and 
NGOs. To explore the behavior pattern of actors, the analysis is conducted through a 
comparative case study of the refugee crises erupting after the Syrian (2011-present) and 
Rwandan (1990-1994) civil wars. The goal of analyzing the Syrian and Rwandan conflicts 
is to understand which factors, present in the Syrian case and absent in the Rwandan, 
alerted international and state level actors to respond. The general conclusion of the two 
case analysis is in parallel with the findings of the realist school; states remain to be the 
main actors of the response to the even humanitarian cases such as refugee flows. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
ULUSLARARASI VE DEVLET DÜZEYİ AKTÖRLERİN  
MÜLTECİ KRİZLERİNE YANITLARI:  
SURİYE (2011-2016) VE RUANDA (1990-1994) 
 
 
SEVDENUR KÖSE 
 
 
Siyaset Bilimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2016 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof.Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: mülteci krizi, devlet, uluslararası organizasyon, STK, Suriye, Ruanda 
 
Bu çalışma, çeşitli aktörlerin iç savaşlar sonrası ortaya çıkan mülteci krizlerine verdiği 
yanıtları belirleyen etkenleri araştırmaktadır. Temel iddia, silahlı iç çatışmaların bazı 
özelliklerinin, iç savaş sonrası çıkan mülteci krizlerine aktörlerin verdiği tepkiler üzerinde 
belirleyici etkisinin olduğudur. Bu tezde, çatışmanın coğrafi yakınlığı, mülteci tipi ve 
profili, mülteci üreten ülkenin dış politikadaki konumu gibi çatışmaya dair özelliklerin 
aktörlerin mülteci krizlerine verdiği yanıtta önemli bir etkisi olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. 
Uluslararası aktörler iki kategoride incelenmiştir: hükümetler arası kuruluşlar ve STK’lar. 
Aktörlerin davranış biçimlerini incelemek amacıyla Suriye (2011-şimdi) ve Ruanda (1990-
1994) iç savaşları sonrası ortaya çıkan mülteci krizlerinin kıyaslamalı analizi yapılmıştır. 
Ruanda ve Suriye çatışmalarını incelemekteki amaç, Suriye vakasında bulunup Ruanda’da 
bulunmayan faktörlerden hangilerinin devlet ve uluslararası aktörleri harekete geçirdiğini 
anlamaktır. İki vaka analizinin genel sonucu realist ekolün tespitleriyle paraleldir; devletler, 
mülteci krizi gibi insani krizlerde dahi en temel aktörler olmayı sürdürmektedir.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Perhaps refugees matter most because they graphically represent the uncertainties and 
fears of coping with the future. Refugees are chronic features in the human experience. 
Today, they are the flesh-blood personification of the chaos and insecurities that we 
confront in the new century which seems so suddenly fraught with danger. They are a 
manifestation of instability in international relations”  
Arthur C. Helton-The Price of Indifference 
 
Humankind is nowadays experiencing one of the toughest times since the World War II. As 
a result of violence, oppression and wars 60 million people have been forced to flee from 
their hometowns after 2013. The daily figure of forced displacement is 42,500; meaning 
that one of 122 individuals has become a refugee, asylum seeker or internally displaced 
person. Up to 51% of these forcibly displaced people target Europe as their final destination 
and country of asylum. Announcing all these figures, UNHCR describes the situation as a 
“paradigm change”1 towards an era of unchecked global displacements at record levels. The 
initial phase of this change was during the mid-1990s with the Rwandan civil war that 
displaced approximately 3.5 million people (Whitaker, 2002). The peak, for now, is the 
Syrian refugee crisis with more than 13 million forcibly displaced population as of July 
2016. Although the UN considers the issue as one of “the five core responsibilities in the 
name of our shared humanity2, it is still puzzling why the state actors and international 
organizations fail to develop working strategies for responding the refugee crises. What 
would be the factors that affect the formulation of an effective response by the states and 
international actors?  
The term “refugee” is only four hundred years old even though it seems to be older at the 
first glance. The concept was formulated after the persecution of Protestants by French and 
uprooted 200,000-300,000 Huguenots population (Dowty and Loescher, 1996). Since then, 
the world has witnessed various refugee influxes paving the way to the drastic increase in 
                                                          
1 From the Speech of António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015.  
2 The UN, “Report of the UN Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit”.  
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the magnitude of the world’s refugees. However, the international aid and the institutional 
responses to the crises has come behind time, with the establishment of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1951 and the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees with the purpose of seeking for permanent solutions for displaced 
people (Cohen and Deng, 1998). When the Commissioner was founded, the number of 
refugees of concern for the UNHCR operational scope was 1.5 million, according to the 
refugee description of the Convention. It scaled up to 8.3 million in 1980; and then 
skyrocketed to 17.4 million in 1990 whereas to 19 million in 2000 (UNHCR Database, 
1980-2000).  
Today, with the ensuing developments in world politics, new categories other than 
“refugee” of the 1951 Convention were formulated for describing people uprooted as a 
result of war, such as Internally Displaced People (IDPs). UNHCR's annual Global Trends 
Report records the highest level ever on the worldwide displacement as 59.9 million 
(UNHCR Global Trends Report, 2014). The exceptional increase in the figures sparks off 
the globalization of the refugee phenomenon, as more and more countries and regions are 
getting involved in the repercussions of massive influxes. 
During its history, the massive migration of people in various ways and forms was an 
ostensible and rhetorical concern for many actors.  However, with the globalization of the 
phenomenon together with its direct linkage to international security and human rights; 
actors in the international arena were repressed to somehow formulate a response to it. 
During and after all instances of mass migration, one common question prepossesses 
researchers, journalists and activists: The world stood by the tragedy of refugees and 
nothing has been done to stop it, why? As the side effects of civil wars, massive number of 
civilians were influenced and forcibly displaced but most doors were shut to their face, 
why? Coming to the exceptionally few ones who kept the door open, what made them 
different and what was the motivation of these actors to welcome refugees? These are 
legitimate questions that require close attention and analysis.  
As “the manifestations of instability” refugees are, according to the former U.S. 
Coordinator of Refugee Affairs Jonathan Moore, “human rights violations made visible” 
(1987, quoted in Drüke, p.217). Dowty and Loescher describe the transformation of the 
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problem in their words: “… the global refugee problem is assuming new dimensions that 
require new and different approaches. Charity is insufficient to deal with today’s refugee 
crisis” (1996, p.69). 
Most scholars agree on the claim that refugees and internally displaced people will 
constitute a major concern for nation-states as well as the international community. One 
way of dealing with the refugee problem is to prevent conditions that prepare the ground 
for massive displacements. Further research, thereby, is a necessity for the international 
relations scholars to develop theories for understanding dynamics of conflicts that uproot 
masses and prominent scholars put tremendous effort for this endeavor under correlates and 
causes of wars. On the other hand, problems related with the post-conflict phase are other 
issues of concern; hence refugees and asylum seekers are a central focus for this line of 
study. To detect systematic obstacles of states and international actors to ease the 
humanitarian suffering of refugees deserve detailed analysis of the responses of various 
actors to refugee crises. 
With this purpose, this thesis investigates the various determinants of responses from 
different actors. The method used is Process Tracing where a deeper analysis of these 
determinants specific to the selected cases will be conducted. This method is considered to 
be complementary for the comparative case study research. Process Tracing helps 
researchers to detect intervening variables, if any, and develop better causal inferences on 
the present independent variables (Bennett and George, 2005). The aim is to search for a 
pattern, if exists, of the conflict related factors in determining the actor-responses to the 
refugee crisis that emerge as a result of civil wars.  
This thesis deals with these issues in the following manners: Some concept definitions are 
provided beforehand to prepare the ground for discussion. Then the Chapter 1 presents the 
literature on actor responses in three categories. The first discussion is on the state-level 
actors and their approach to massive influxes. In the second part, the literature on 
organizational responses is divided into two: intergovernmental organizations and non-
governmental organizations.  
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Afterwards, the following chapters 2 and 3 introduce the cases by following the same order 
of actor analyses. In the second chapter, the determinants of state level and organizational 
level responses for the Syrian refugee influx are explored. The organizational responses are 
investigated again as intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental ones. A 
similar discussion is carried out for the Rwandan refugee crisis in chapter 3.  
In the final chapter, a comparative analysis of the Syria and Rwanda cases is conducted. 
Here, the main findings of this thesis is presented; and the determining factors of actors’ 
responses to refugee crisis are discussed in the fourth chapter.  Then the study is concluded 
with some suggestions for future research based on the propositions of this study. The aim 
of this study is to contribute to the effort of understanding state and organizational behavior 
in the anarchical nature of the world system by analyzing the approaches of these actors to 
a humanitarian issue, that is refugees. The expectation is that comprehending the factors 
determining how actors behave and react to each other will help us to find ways to 
overcome the systematic obstacles to end human suffering.  
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CONCEPT DEFINITIONS 
 
“It was very bad it took a long time. You don’t have confidence whether you are accepted 
or not… It is better if you have status; status is everything. Without status you have 
nothing… with status it is good.”  
Alemu, Refugee in Kenya3 
 
To discuss actor responses to massive migration, certain definitions of various statuses 
about massive migration should be clarified in order to set a firm ground for further 
analysis. In the following part, definitions of fundamental terms such as “refugee”, “asylum 
seeker” and “temporal protection” are provided.  
To begin with, the term refugee is defined in 1A of the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) an 
individual who: 
“… owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his [or her] nationality and  is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail him[her]self of the protection of that country; or who, not having 
a nationality and being outside the country of his [or her] former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it” (1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, 1951, 1A(2)). 
The person’s “well-founded fear of persecution” in the country of nationality is the main 
reason for a person to ask for asylum to another country. That means in order for the 
refugee status to be granted, the asylum seeker should convince the authorities that she or 
he will face the fear of persecution if goes back to the country of nationality. Another point 
of concern in the definition is “protection” which is supposed to be provided by the country 
of origin.  If the country fails, then the Convention puts the responsibility of protection on 
the other actors in the international arena. The status of refugee is embodiment of this 
protection. 
                                                          
3 Quoted from Odhiambo-Abuya, 2004, p.196. 
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There are different categories of refugee status which could be classified as: Asylum 
seeker, prima facie refugee, temporary protection or beneficiary of subsidiary protection 
and internally displaced people. Below, detailed definitions for these terms and their 
differentiating aspects are presented. 
Asylum, simply put, is the request for refugee status. The UNHCR differentiates between 
an asylum seeker and refugee as a claim for a status and grant of the claimed status. An 
asylum seeker is an individual who comes to the authorities in a state claiming that she is a 
refugee. She becomes a refugee when the necessary investigation is conducted and her 
status is finalized (UNHCR, 20164). 
An important distinction between the refugee and asylum seeker is a procedural one with 
regards to the location of the individual at the time of application. An asylum application 
can be reviewed if the person submitting the application is physically within the territory or 
at a port of entry to the host country. On the other hand, a refugee application is reviewed 
when the applicant is outside of the country from which he/she asks for refugee status 
(Ostrand, 2015). 
Prima facie refugee status is a closely related concept for the purposes of this article. It is a 
group determination with a prima facie (i.e. at first appearance) basis developed for the 
cases of massive migration as a result of the overwhelming application for the state 
capacity. For the situations of massive influx following a civil war, with this status, the 
displaced people are ensured protection, non-refoulement and humanitarian treatment. This 
status usually applies in such a situation that states are unable to investigate the individual 
applications of the overwhelming number of asylum seekers. In fact, states do not need to 
investigate the real reasons for the applications; because the reason is sufficiently self-
explanatory and genuine (Rutinwa, 2002).  
The Temporary Protection Status is another term, similar to the prima facie refugee status 
in that it is a status referred in the cases of massive influx. However, its difference is that 
the individual is not guaranteed with a permanent asylum and hence does not have the 
rights that the Convention offers. UNHCR recognizes this kind of a status that states grant, 
                                                          
4 UNHCR Glossary, “Status Determination and Protection Information Section”.  
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but the Commission underlines certain points. Most essential one is that this temporary 
protection should be for a “reasonable” period of time. The protector states should not 
prolong the duration of temporary protection and grant the asylum seeker with refugee 
status (Rutinwa, 2002). Moreover, UNCHR recognizes this type of protection as a 
“pragmatic tool of international protection” as a result of states’ response to the 
overwhelming influx incidents (UNHCR, Guidelines on Temporary Protection or Stay 
Arrangements, 2014). A very similar status may be entitled differently at the regional basis, 
such as beneficiary of subsidiary protection, for the person who seeks asylum; but, does not 
qualify the refugee status according to the European Law’s Qualification Directive 
(Revised version of 2011, Article 2(f)).  
As a part of the refugee status, a related concept is the invocation of a cessation clause that 
implies the termination of the status as the conditions leading to grant of the status exists no 
more. According to the 1951 Convention, the clause is invoked “in situations where, due to 
a change of circumstances in their home country, refugees no longer require international 
protection and cannot, therefore, refuse to avail themselves of the protection of their 
country.” (1951 Convention, Article 1). The cessation clause goes in effect when the 
situation in the country of origin has been stabilized for the long term and the reasons and 
circumstances for asylum that made the person flee do not exist any more.  
Finally, Internally Displaced People (IDP) is the term attributed to the people who are 
forced to flee from their home, however within the boundaries of their country of 
nationality. Because this kind of flight takes place within the country, the IDPs cannot ask 
for asylum and reach protection by a second state. Situations leading to emergence of 
massive IDP populations are cases of armed civil conflict, generalized violence, human 
right violations or disasters. For the most part, the problem is that generally the incumbent 
governments are either unable or unwilling to realize their protection function (Hampton, 
2014).  
IDPs are different from refuges; both in terms of description and coverage. To understand 
the substantial nuance between refugee and IDPs, United Nations Human Rights Office of 
the High Commissioner, in “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” which is 
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prepared for clarifying the gray areas as IDPs, makes the essential distinction why refugee 
status is not granted to the IDPs: 
Persons forcibly displaced from their homes who cannot or choose not to cross a 
border, therefore, are not considered refugees, even if they share many of the same 
circumstances and challenges as those who do. Unlike refugees, these internally 
displaced persons do not have a special status in international law with rights 
specific to their situation. The term "internally displaced person" is merely 
descriptive5. 
All the above descriptions prioritize states as the party to formulate some kind of action and 
the legal base for that action when faced with a massive influx. Under the scope of the 
Responsibility to Protect -which will be further discussed in the following parts- states are 
identified as the primary responsible actors for “protecting populations from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement” (UNGA, 
2009 6 ). This responsibility points at states one more time when it comes to refugee 
protection, according to O’Sullivan (2012). Underlying this crucial point, she reaches to the 
conclusion that all the abovementioned status descriptions are based on state and 
nationality. In relation to that, by referring to the requirements of granting the refugee 
status -such as being outside of the country or asking for protection of another country- 
O’Sullivan underlines the fact that the Convention centralizes the state as the main actor for 
responding to mass influxes (p.89). 
Thereby, an ipso facto discussion emerges over what states should do and what are their 
responsibilities. The principles of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and non-refoulement are 
the keys for following this discussion. These concepts and their relation with the state-level 
responses to the refugee crises, together with the literature built around them will be 
discussed in the next section.   
 
 
 
                                                          
5United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner.  
6United Nations General Assembly Secretary-General's 2009 Report, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
1.1. Literature on the State-Level Actor Responses to Refugee Crises 
 
“We must … move towards embracing and acting on the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ potential or actual victims of massive atrocities. The time has come 
for governments to be held to account, both to their citizens and to each 
other, for respect of the dignity of the individual, to which they too often pay 
only lip service. We must move from an era of legislation to an era of 
implementation. Our declared principles and our common interests demand 
no less.” 
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
Explaining the state behavior has been one of the heated debates in international relations 
studies. Although the labels may vary such as idealists versus constructivists or realists 
versus liberals; there have been two main camps around which the discussion gathers: 
norms versus interests, as the motivation for state behavior.  
Scholars adopting a constructivist approach to the debate between norms and interests 
mostly argue that norm-based evaluation has a powerful influence on particularly issues 
such as burden sharing considered as a part of common good (Thielemann, 2003). 
Comparing ‘the logic of expected consequences’ with ‘the logic of appropriateness’ (March 
and Olsen, 1998), they conclude that the institutional context, the perception of the others 
about what is ‘appropriate’ and the socially constructed principles are decisive on the 
actions of actors. 
Particularly, this ‘norms versus interests’ debate comes to the table while discussing the 
human rights regimes. The claim is that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of 
the Cold War and the thereafter relative enhancement in international trade, states and other 
international actors tend to adopt normative evaluations of matters regarding human rights 
(Rosenblum and Saleyhan, 2004).  To put it in Jacobon’s words: 
International human rights codes . . . are becoming the vehicle that is transforming 
the nation-state system . . . [and] the basis of state legitimacy is shifting from 
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principles of sovereignty and national self determination to international human 
rights (1996, p.2; quoted from Rosenblum and Saleyhan, 2004). 
However, this claim has been challenged from various perspectives and schools. The 
interest-based approach of the realist account takes cost-benefit calculation of actors for 
their decision making processes. For this perspective, institutional context does not 
influence the actor’s decision. States, being the rational utility maximizers, follow their 
interests even if the subject matter is human rights. Theories around phenomena such as 
realpolitik, raison d’état or security dilemma have been developed around the realm of 
realism.  (e.g.  Mearshimer, 1994; Waltz 1984).  
Following the assumptions of realism, this thesis is centralized around the idea that states, 
as still being the main actors of the international arena, base their decision on their rational 
calculations of interests even if it comes to humanitarian intervention. For their cost-benefit 
calculations, states put their very basic survival instinct at the center and prioritize their 
security. The state logic follows consequentialism which dictates that it is better to have a 
bounded scope of humanitarian intervention than having no agreement at all. Hence, the 
conclusion is that it is always going to be up to the moral/cultural/normative or material 
calculations of those who have the power to engage in humanitarian intervention (Brown, 
1992). 
Moreover, during the crisis of massive influxes, Wheeler asserts that there will be always a 
room for state manipulation of humanitarian intervention, by the strong making it a weapon 
turned against the weak (2000). States will never intervene unless their self interests guide 
them to do so. Exceptionally enough, it is only a hope to wish that humanitarian 
intervention would coincide with the national security targets. Inevitably, this paves the 
way for selective intervention and instrumental humanitarianism. The logic behind this 
selectivity is that states never risk the lives of their own people to save foreigners unless 
they have an interest out of it. For this foreign operations, what prevents intervention is the 
statist Huntington logic, as he asserted on the US intervention in Somalia: 
It is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that members of the US armed 
forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing one another (quoted from 
Smith, 1998, p.63). 
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Similarly, refugee protection and granting of asylum is applied selectively. For the realistic 
thinking, refugees are not considered as victims of wars; they are rather actors in civil wars. 
They are one critical source of instability and a heavy burden for some cases; they may 
even constitute existential threats to the state structure (Wheeler, 2000).   
Coming to the humanitarian law and norms on international protection, according to the 
realists, the state perception is that justifying normative commitments to rules is a part of 
the pursuit of interests. That is why, abiding by rules and norms in fact it is a part of the 
game to avoid moral and material sanctions (Wheeler, 2000). When it comes to refugees, 
these norms, which are supposed to protect interests should be framed in such a way that 
national security of states is prioritized (Whitaker, 2002). Mostly, states do not prefer to 
make ‘naked threats’; thus they find something to put on their claims in order to legitimate 
what they do in the eyes of domestic and international constituencies (Wheeler, 2000). 
Hence states may welcome refugees as long as they do not constitute a threat. When a state 
does not see an existential threat, then rational calculations come into the picture: whether 
or not accepting a refugee would provide benefits for the interests of that state.  
At this point, the idealist understanding of humanitarianism experiences a shift; from 
monistic humanitarianism to instrumental humanitarianism. The former one was described 
as determining laws and principles purely based on human rights and freedoms. 
Instrumental humanitarianism, on the other hand, provides alternatives for decision makers 
to choose best serving method to its own calculations. Acting similar with economists, this 
cost-benefit analysis mostly shapes the strategies of actors towards humanitarian 
intervention and assistance to refugees (Whitaker, 2002). Although this shift has been 
claimed to happen in 1990, political and rational approach to international protection is an 
old and long-lasting phenomenon (Callamard, 1994). 
One way to understand the applicability of these various theories would be to look at the 
state behavior when faced with an international crisis. This thesis, approaches to the crises 
that emanate as a result of massive migration; since this type of crises are, on the one hand 
an issue of human rights and related norms; and an issue of national security and interest, 
on the other, posing the old well-known dilemma.  
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Looking from this window of state perspective towards refugee protection and asylum 
granting at times of massive influx, two essential concepts come to the forefront: the 
principles of Responsibility to Protect and non-refoulement. This section begins with the 
discussion of these two principles and moves to the theories on factors that prepare the 
ground for refugee production and the corollary state responses.  
The Principle of Responsibility to Protect  
In 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, developments in the Middle East, Africa and 
Balkans have resulted in revisions of international law and state obligations for protecting 
individuals from violence. The civil wars and ethnic cleansing instances that the 
international community was highly criticized for its inaction resulted in revision of the 
perspective towards humanitarian intervention (Barbour and Gorlick, 2008). In the 2005 
World Summit Outcome, a new norm was accepted by the UN member states called The 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This is the principle that mainly shapes both international 
and state level responses to most human rights violations. Although R2P principle is one of 
the concepts in political science that there is no definitional consensus; the common sense 
implies the logic behind it and frames as the following:  
R2P is the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own 
citizens from avoidable catastrophe … but that when they are unwilling or unable to 
do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states (ICISS 
Report, 2001).   
The definition of the UN, on the other hand, contains three pillars of the R2P principle 
which will be discussed in the following section on international responses: 
1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and 
their incitement; 
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist 
States in fulfilling this responsibility; 
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these 
crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the 
international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect 
populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UN 
World Summit, 2005).  
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The relevance of the concept for this chapter is that sovereign states are held responsible 
first for protecting their own citizens, and then all the others who are in need of protection. 
The R2P dictates that humanitarian intervention is legitimate when states fail to apply 
human rights massively and systematically (Wheeler, 2000). Hence the second part of this 
twofold burden on the state is about the encumbrance that comes as a result of being a 
member of the international community. Specified as responsibility to prevent, 
responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild (Barbour and Gorlick, 2008), the R2P 
concept in general puts the burden of protecting victims of mass atrocities on the state and 
checks it with international community which is again made out of mostly state actors. 
Hence, although the term R2P was formulated by the international institutions with regards 
to the international community, the practical burden of protecting victims is still on 
individual states. The fact that the international system positions the nation state as the 
main responsible for both refugee outflow and protection supports the main purpose of this 
thesis. Rather than the international community in general, individual states are the major 
actors that are held accountable for their actions by the international law, when they give 
rise to humanitarian crisis (Dowty and Loescher, 1996).  
Arguably, the main reasoning behind the idea of responsibility to protect might be 
connected to the raison d’état.  The literature on refugee flows focuses on the probability of 
increased violence as the scope of influx expands.  Although it differs across cases and 
within context, scholars argue that refugee influxes are statistically significantly correlated 
with the probability of civil as well as international conflicts (Saleyhan, 2007; Saleyhan and 
Gledistch, 2006). The impact on civil conflict may be in the forms of (1) economic burden 
on the host country, (2) upsetting the ethnic balance of the host country or (3) directly 
threatening security of the host (Saleyhan, 2007) by what Zolberg et al. term as “refugee 
warriors” (1979). Considering the vitality of the impacts of refugee flows on host country, 
and the neighbor states (Weiner, 1996), responsibility to protect, as a mechanism to avoid 
undesired consequences is a perfectly rational act for individual states and their survival.  
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The Principle of Non-refoulement  
Refoulement stands for the deportation of individuals who could have been entitled to the 
refugee status since he/she qualifies for some conditions. The non-refoulement principle, as 
the 1951 Refugee Convention defines in Article 33(1): 
No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion (1951 Geneva Refugee Convention). 
The refugee status is granted by states as a form of protection based on the non-refoulement 
principle together with the international or national refugee rights (Eurostat, 2016). Most 
scholars agree that this principle constitutes the core content of the protection phenomenon 
also within the understanding of customary law (Lauterpacht and Betlehem, 2000; cited 
from Supaat, 2013). Goodwin-Gill and Mc Adam analyze the historical evolution of the 
international refugee law and conclude that “there is substantial, if not conclusive authority 
that the principle is binding on all states, independently of specific assent” (1996, p.351).  
Chimni (2000) argues that although states have varying approaches to asylum recognition 
and refugee rights, all states agree on the principle of non-refoulement and conceive it as a 
duty to not to force an individual to go back to a country where she will face persecution or 
fear. The cases in which states, in their actions, seem to be not in lined with this theoretical 
commitment are considered as violations to the non-refoulement principle; hence scholars 
do not consider it as denial or rejection of the principle. To put in other words, the 
justifications of states for their breach of international law is actually an acknowledgement 
of their commitment to the principle (Supaat, 2013; Rodger, 2001).  
However, the realist account discusses that the international norms regarding the states 
sovereignty leave the room for human rights violations; giving states license to bomb its 
people. The point on the humanitarian intervention that becomes a discussion point is the 
contradiction between morality of norms and actual material state practices. Although states 
adopt the norms and principles as de jure, the implementation and enforcement phases are 
problematic and real concerns emerge there. History proves that in some cases, states turn 
their war making machinery against their own citizens. Thus, for some cases, norms may 
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grant states the autonomy to violate human rights and devaluate the international law 
(Wheeler, 2000).  
Determinants of State Responses 
Other than the legal framework for state responsibility and behavior, there are certain 
conflict related factors which shape state behavior. First of all, spillover effect is one of the 
possible repercussions of the refugee crises in the eyes of governments. Also termed as the 
neighborhood effect, it corresponds to the probability of conflicts to ricochet into 
neighboring countries when the refugee number soars in a limited time period (Weiner, 
1996). The roots of the spillover effect go back to the fact that civil wars create various 
costs for the neighboring countries. These costs can fuel certain mechanisms in the 
neighbors which results in civil conflict. One of these costs is human costs of civil war, 
which may pave the way for spillover effect to the neighbors, even to a neighborhood 
(Saleyhan, 2007; Weiner, 1996; Widgren, 1990).  
As the probability of a spillover emerges, states perceive the refugee influxes as a threat to 
their existence, namely to the national security. The destabilizing impact of refugee flows 
doubled with the potential of spillover leading to regional wars urges the need of states to 
develop self-protection mechanisms (Dowty and Loescher, 1996).  
Another conflict related factor that affects the state responses is the type of refugee that the 
conflict produces. Characteristics of refugee groups that demonstrate the level of cultural 
proximity of refugees and host society shape the state responses to the crisis. States 
evaluate the commonalities and differences of two societies and formulate a response 
accordingly.  
The literature on refugee studies categorizes the refugees in order to analyze the level of 
each category’s potential for inciting another civil conflict or somehow engaging in human 
rights violations. Lischer (2005), conducting various case studies on refugee camps, comes 
up with three types of refugees: situational, persecuted and state-in-exile.  
The first category of situational refugees are the victims of mass atrocities and chaos of 
war. The refugees of this type are considered to be willing to return their home country 
after the provision of sustainable peace and stability. Also they are assumed to have the 
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least tendency to involve in military actions (Saleyhan 2014). The second category of 
persecuted refugees are the individuals who chose the path to flee into another country 
because they were among the direct targets of violence and pressure on their groups or 
identity. Ethnic cleansing cases are considered under this category. This type also described 
as willing to return however they require credible guarantees of security for themselves and 
families in case of return. Compared with the first type, prosecuted refugees are more likely 
to engage in violence against the oppressive regime. Finally, the state-in-exile type of 
refugees are the ones who flee for political and military reasons, mostly to escape from a 
likely defeat in the battle. The fragile position of this type of refugees deter them from 
returning home. The only case which makes the return option viable for them is a change in 
government back home. This refugee type is the most likely to involve in insurgency 
considering that these are the remnants of the previous government after a coup d’état.   
By this classification, Lischer (2005) establishes a scale for the probability of a refugee to 
get militarized and partake in violence. A state perceives the need to evaluate the possibility 
that refugees that it grants asylum are actually among the “refugee warriors” (Zolberg et al., 
1979) which may pave the way for a spillover. Furthermore, the situation might be much 
more complicated than presumed, according to Saleyhan (2014):  
Refugee communities are frequently “manipulated” by states pursuing their own 
agendas vis-à-vis rivals in the international system and the degree of refugee 
militarization is not simply a function of the refugee community’s own goals and 
strategies, but is also shaped by government policy (p.272).  
Correspondingly, the perception is that states need to develop necessary means to confront 
this threat, for their own survival. Considering it within the framework of conflict 
management and national security purposes; the conclusion can be described as 
“securitizing” of refugees by states. Thus Saleyhan (2014) emphasizes the danger of this 
securitization by stating “States have often played politics with refugee communities, either 
using refugee flows to further their own geostrategic interest or by unnecessarily casting 
refugees as “threats” (p.275).   
However, some scholars interpret this instinctual response of states as a result of the trade-
off they face. Rogers and Copeland describe a “dilemma of common aversion” that brings 
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about a zero-sum game in which “one state’s effort to reduce its own burden only increases 
the demands on others” (1993, p.116; quoted from Dowty, 1996).  The complications of 
massive refugee movements to one country will not be local; unilateral decisions of a state 
will have repercussions on other states.  
On the other hand, the reciprocal foreign policy positioning of the host and sending 
countries could be seen as an alternative explanation of the state behavior when responding 
to the refugee influxes. To put in simpler terms, whether they are allies or rivals to each 
other influences the way states respond to the crises. Saleyhan (2014; also Whitaker, 2002) 
claims that host countries may be more willing to accept the refugees fleeing from civil 
conflicts of rival states rather than allies. He describes this state behavior as a means to 
discredit the rival government and help the exiled opposition to the sending government. 
Similarly, not welcoming refugees from an ally signals that the host country does not 
acknowledges the fact that the sender country cannot protect its citizens or violate human 
rights which would embarrass the ally.  
Saleyhan’s approach signifies the essentiality of state level responses and underlines the 
fact that these responses are mainly influenced from the conflict related factors. That is to 
say, states do not formulate their policies towards a refugee crisis simply with their own 
understanding of human rights, responsibility, level of democracy or commitment to peace. 
The characteristics of conflict that begot the influx also shape the national security policy, 
domestic audience costs and negotiations on the international arena. States position 
themselves after considering these factors and formulate their response to the crisis.  
All in all, various factors are claimed in the literature to be effective in state responses to 
refugee crises. However, to understand what kind of actors more actively engage in the 
response to mass migration, an analysis of the international actors should be conducted. 
Hence, the literature on IGOs and NGOs will be overviewed in the following part.  
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1.2.The Literature on International Responses to Refugee Crises 
 
“The impetuous development and propagation in the international 
community of human rights doctrines, particularly after the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, has brought about 
significant changes in international law, notably in the approach to 
problems besetting the world community.  
A state-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a 
human-being-oriented approach.” 
 
Prosecutor v. Tadic,  
Decision on the Defense Motion for  
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction    
 
 
This part will analyze the literature on responses coming from the international community 
by categorizing the actors as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). What differentiates NGOs from IGOs for the 
purposes of this thesis is that the operational scope of IGOs contains political, diplomatic, 
economic or even military tools for intervention; NGOs, on the other hand, base their 
action scope on principle of voluntariness.  
1.2.1. Intergovernmental Organizations 
The Responsibility to Protect Principle at the International Level 
 
The application of The Responsibility to Protect Principle by the international community 
and more specifically by IGOs is related with the postulation that these agencies are held 
responsible for first, assisting the states that in need of help to protect their citizens; then to 
formulate a collective response against states who manifestly fail to protect their citizens. 
As discussed in the previous part, the three pillars of R2P Principle are defined in the UN 
World Summit (2005) within this framework of collective responsibility.  
 
The theoretical background for the idea of the response of international community 
constituting a ‘responsibility’ can be traced back to the customary law. Most scholars argue 
that international preventive action against massive migration is compatible with the 
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customary law (e.g. Barbour and Gorlick, 2008; Helton, 2002). Also the President of the 
International Crisis Group Gareth Evans states in his words: 
In the space of just five short years, a blink of an eye in the history of ideas, the 
concept of R2P - and with it, above all, the notion that sovereignty was not a license 
to kill, had, it seemed, evolved from a gleam in a rather obscure international 
commission's eye, to what now had the pedigree to be described as a broadly 
accepted international norm, and one with the potential to evolve further into a rule 
of customary international law (Development and Peace Foundation Symposium, 
2007). 
Furthermore, the Principle of non-Refoulement is also embedded in the customary law since 
it also binds even states which are not among the signatories of refugee conventions 
(Helton, 2002). However, the applicability of customary law on developing grounds for 
refugee flows is contentious. The late emergency of an international legal basis for the 
status of refugees is the main disincentive for customary law to be more effective. The 
reason is simple; because the history of refugee crises is very short. Hence the answer for 
the question of why does not customary law impose a restriction on host countries -except 
for a few cases- is the lack of experience for massive amount of refugee flows before the 
20th century (Dowty and Loescher, 1996). 
However, at the operationalization of the R2P, the literature propounds the discussion of 
Westphalian state sovereignty as the main obstacle to formulation of a collective response 
to mass migration crises. As aforementioned by Evans (2007), the logic behind the 
intervention is that refugees are the manifestation of internationalization of an internal 
conflict; and sovereignty should be bounded by the state’s responsibility to protect its own 
citizens. As Weiner argues: 
A country that forces its citizens to leave or create conditions which induce them to 
leave has internationalized its internal actions… If a people violate the boundaries 
of a neighboring country, then they and their government should expect others to 
intervene in their internal affairs (1992, p. 25). 
The reasoning is very simple; state which fails to carry out its basic function of securing its 
citizens violates its justification for exercising authority and calls its sovereignty into 
question (Dowty and Loescher, 1996). Also the R2P Principle itself, according to Barbour 
and Gorlick (2008), is not about protecting the actors from intervention; it aims at 
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protecting those who are in need of protection and support. Hence the focus of R2P, as 
defined by the UN, is and should be on victims of prosecution and violence.  
As a part of this sovereignty puzzle, certain mechanisms are developed to effectively 
respond to humanitarian crises. The principle of “burden sharing”, as Garvey explains, aims 
at spreading responsibilities with regards to asylum and providing protection for the “boat 
people” in an equitable way among states. This solution can be arrived at by using the state-
to-state relations as an international leverage to formally convince the actors to fulfill what 
their responsibilities require. For this purpose, he suggests a reformulation of international 
refugee law in such a way that the burden is shared by states and the problem is resolved by 
developing inter-state relations (Garvey, 1985). For the application, the IGOs will take the 
lead on coordination and distribution of the burden.  
Other than burden-sharing, officials of intergovernmental organizations try to come up with 
concepts such as “sovereignty as responsibility”7 to overcome the sovereignty obstacle, the 
problem seems to be more profound than presumed. The case studies in the following 
sections demonstrate the current picture that states still do not allow supranational or 
intergovernmental authorities and agencies to interfere and undermine their sovereignty.  
IGO Tools: Hard versus Soft Intervention 
To understand the general framework of how intergovernmental agencies develop 
responses to humanitarian crises in general, one should comprehend the utilization of soft 
and hard intervention tools of these organizations. Some experiences of mass migration 
demonstrated that humanitarian measures are not adequate and IGOs embarked the duty to 
formulate other mechanisms to deal with the refugee problem. 
To begin with, the soft intervention tools are considered to be political and diplomatic 
efforts, financial contribution to development, promotion of democratic institutions and 
civil society, monitoring human right violations (Crisp et. al., 2013). It may continue with 
operationalization of punitive IGO exercises such as naming and shaming. These are all as 
part of the responsibility to prevent on behalf of the international community, namely to 
                                                          
7 The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. 
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preclude the onset of any violence and a corollary refugee influx. The hard intervention 
tools, on the other hand, are utilized when the civil conflict is militarized and human rights 
violations take place progressively. At this point, IGOs may opt for launching hard 
intervention tools of military action in order to cease the ongoing violence and abuses 
(Dowty and Loescher, 1996). Obviously, these functions require financial and social 
funding which is the part that IGOs comes into play with their means of coordination and 
resource provision. 
No doubt that the hard intervention measures paves the way for an increased awareness on 
relation between refugee influxes and state national, regional and international security. 
Dowty and Loescher (1996) argue that other than humanitarian grounds, securitization of 
refugee crises also contributes to reformulating the norm of responsibility to prevent. As 
the number of refugees and the corollary burden on states increase, the international 
community is obliged to establish a common ground for viable policy options based upon 
the ongoing experiences.  
Obstacles of Intergovernmental Organizations 
UHCR and similar organizations claim that the mandate and mission of such organizations 
is “to lead and coordinate international action for the worldwide protection of refugees and 
the resolution of refugee problems” (UNHCR Mission Statement, 2011). However, from a 
legalistic perspective, O’Sullivan (2012) underlines an important fact: “Non-state entities 
are not accountable under the international law” (p.107). Hence she concludes that they 
should not be granted with the “protection” capability. The only case in which a state 
allows a non-state actor to exercise authority is only under a temporary basis and with a 
limitation for law enforcement capabilities. By criticizing the silence of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention on the power and capacities of non-state actors, she concludes that the only 
non-state actor that should be granted with the protection capability is the ones that can act 
as a stable, state-like entity. One other exception to the principle is the cases in which the 
state responsible for protection of its citizens is a failed state, namely it is not able to 
practice its function and authority (2012).  
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The reasoning behind this approach is also a humanitarian one; if the non-state entity does 
not have the responsibility to protect, because it is a state responsibility, then the principle 
of non-refoulement cannot apply. Practically, the non-state entity does not have the 
authority to accept refugees or grand asylum simply because it is not a state. Then the 
individuals who are under the ostensible protection of a non-state entity will be facing the 
jeopardy of being returned to the country in which he/she will confront persecution risk 
(O’Sullivan, 2012). That is why, the operational scope of international or 
intergovernmental organizations are really limited to the rare cases in which the non-state 
actor can assume the role of a state or its structure is similar to a state.  
Another problematic aspect of intergovernmental organizations in formulating responses to 
refugee crises is the collective action problem (Olson, 1965). Described as the disincentives 
that a group face when pursuing a common purpose and joint action, collective action 
problem is one of the biggest obstacles to the establishment of a coordinated, systematic 
international response to refugee crises. Most scholars approach refugee protection as a 
common good which can be exposed to what Hardin (1968) calls the tragedy of commons 
(e.g. Roper and Baria, 2010; Thielemann, 2003; Betts, 2003). As the typical reaction to the 
collective action, free riding is an obstacle for taking internationally collaborative action at 
times of massive migration crises. According to Saleyhan (2014), intergovernmental 
organizations face this problem when they try to coordinate the distribution of funding for 
refugee protection agencies among the member countries in order to actuate the burden-
sharing mechanism.  
As a solution, some scholars claim that norms can be operational in order to counterbalance 
the selfish, profit maximizing reflexes of individual states (Theilemann and Dewan, 2006). 
Following the line of traditional peacekeeping under the umbrella of soft intervention, they 
have developed concepts such as corridors of tranquility, cross-mandate preventive zones, 
safe heavens or humanitarian ceasefires. Dowty and Loescher (1996) argue that although 
these mechanisms for intervention produced positive results in some cases, the general 
perception is that they mostly remain in theory. The two co-authors claim that the 
ineffectiveness is mostly because of the hastily-formulation of these mechanisms as a 
prompt response to the emergency situations, even when it comes to hard intervention 
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tools. However, Dowty and Loescher further clarify a more profound point and underline 
the essentiality of willingness of states to take part in the joint action: 
International action to prevent refugee problems continues to be hampered by the 
unwillingness of major governments to commit resources to engage in large scale 
operations in the midst of internal conflicts, by the limited capacity of international 
organizations to undertake tasks they have been asked to assume, and by a lack of 
consensus regarding the protection of civilians in countries affected by armed 
conflict and the collapse of state authority (p.68). 
In the IO literature, IGO functions are generally classified as multilateral coordination and 
bilateral facilitation. Studies show that IGOs produce more effective results on conflict 
resolution when they operate as facilitators for bilateral negotiations rather than multilateral 
efforts (Shannon, 2009). Betts (2004) theorizes that when performing the multilateral 
coordination for refugee crises, the organizations assumes the central responsibility and 
leading position for coordination, allocation and monitoring of the planned actions. The 
member states are mostly passive donors of the prior distribution of costs by the 
organization. When it comes to bilateral facilitation, the IGO undertakes more of a 
contracted role of facilitation of dyadic endeavors and less of an extensive multilateral, 
collective action. The application of the latter function provides more space to individual 
states, thus they can elaborate on their own methods, approaches and initiatives considering 
their national interests and priorities.  
After the comparison of bilateral facilitation and multilateral coordination, Betts (2004) 
reaches the conclusion that IGOs should not disregard the state instinct to follow their own 
interests when coordinating the international responses to refugee crises. Her analysis on 
the ineffectiveness of multilateral coordination cases also demonstrates the state level 
actors’ dominancy in decision making. More concretely, the only way to address the 
collective action and free riding problem, IGOs need to bring individual states to the 
ground that their contribution to the application of R2P and burden-sharing actually will be 
for their own good and survival.  
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1.2.2. Non-Governmental Organizations 
“For the last 100 years, militarism and humanitarianism have represented 
two sides of the same coin: humankind’s inability to manage conflict 
peacefully.” 
 
Hugo Slim 
The Stretcher and the Drum 
 
Non-governmental organizations are the non-profit organizations that are mainly voluntary-
based in their operations. Their mission is to promote development and humanitarian 
assistance and thus, they are supposed to be non-violent, non-political and objective 
organizations which are independent of interventions by governments and business (Weiss, 
1999). However, the very nature of the NGO has been historically proven to be constrained 
by the state actors. They are the actors created for dealing with the problems that states 
cause. To understand the relationship between state militarism and humanitarian aid, Slim 
refers to the historical development of NGOs; behind almost all of the humanitarian relief 
organization, there stands a war: The Battle of Solferino behind The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); the 1921 Russian civil war and the following famine 
behind The American Relief Association (ARA); The First World War behind the Save the 
Children Fund (SCF); The Second World War behind The US Committee for Aid and 
Relief Everywhere (CARE) and OXFAM (1996).  
The increasing trend for the relief organizations for displaced people can be explained 
through the increment of intra-state conflicts and the corollary civilian casualties. Cross 
(2001) provides a statistical comparison; the civilian casualty rate was 5% a hundred years 
ago; whereas the current figure is 90%. According to him, these organizations are the key 
players for provision of relief in most crises. Describing NGOs as “knowledgeable, 
principled and committed”, he underlines the capacities of these organizations in 
“networking, media links and using the power of women” (p.12).  
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Obstacles of Non-Governmental Organizations 
On the other hand, the reality of NGOs is that they have to operate in a world dominated by 
state actors and hence their actions scope of influence is constrained. NGOs have to face 
various obstacles resulted by their very nature. Some scholars claim that humanitarian 
organizations, very similar to military agencies, are not sufficient for the resolution of 
crises; because the solutions to the root problems of the refugee producing conflict are 
beyond their function and authority (Gourlay, 2000). The fact that NGO operations cannot 
be effective as politically arrived resolutions creates the impression that NGOs are 
substitute organizations for political intervention and thus the scapegoats of any failure 
(Minear and Sommers, 2000). 
Another structural complication is the lack of resources for the conduct of vast amount of 
operations. The inherent problem is their leaning on self-help measures. They are the actual 
field workers of relief, unlike the politicians or military personnel working from the offices 
away. NGOs need to settle down in the host country, provide their own accommodation, 
personnel and equipment through their network and funding lines (Cross, 2001). That is 
why; they are very dependent on the international climate as well as the cooperation of the 
host country. 
Another issue that has been raised as a result of NGO nature is their single-issue focus. 
These organizations are established for a purpose and this may sometimes narrow down 
their perspective leading to neglect the wider scope. That is why; their operations 
occasionally are disrupted by some other organizations or authorities Cross, 2001).  
Also the rivalry between NGOs can be an entanglement as well. Either among the local 
organizations or between international and local ones, competition for resources is a 
weakness for NGOs that cuts down on their performance and effectiveness (Cross, 2001). 
One way to resolve this problem of coordination is to have a coordinative or leader NGO 
which may resolve the conflicts between smaller NGOs (Von Bernuth, 1996). Bennett 
(1995) also suggests a body such as an NGO forum would also facilitate cooperation. This 
fact demonstrates that the cases in which a leader NGO is absent, the local organizations 
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face coordination problems; even if they are high in numbers. However, the non-profit and 
voluntary nature of NGOs prevents centralism to exist in the structure (Von Bernuth, 1996). 
Furthermore, the expansive structure of NGOs culminates in problems of promptness in 
their response to crises. It requires certain amount of time for NGOs to settle in the crisis 
area and initiate their operations as a result of certain bureaucratic and structural procedures 
that often constitute obstacles (Cross, 2001). That is why, for most of the cases they need to 
cooperate with the host governments to enhance the effectiveness of coordination (Bennett, 
1995).  
As the government policies affect the positioning and performance of NGO operations, the 
vice versa might be an obstacle. From a realist perspective, the presence of NGOs lessens 
the responsibility of the state actors to take care of refugees and help them evade realizing 
the R2P. As an unintended consequence of NGO service, Cohen and Deng (1998) claim 
that some states reject asylum applications because the need of shelter and protection and 
accommodation are already being taken care of by the humanitarian agencies in the “safe 
heavens”. Also the “open relief centers” may constitute an excuse for state’s free riding 
tendencies (Cohen and Deng, 1998). Consequently, the result might be exactly opposite of 
what NGOs would desire, as Cohen states “As inhospitality to asylum seekers grows, with 
increasing numbers of countries finding it too costly, burdensome, or destabilizing to admit 
refugees, the numbers of those displaced within their home countries may continue to rise 
in proportion to refugees (p.30). 
Similarly, the literature regards another oblique threat coming from the NGO operations for 
refugees. Lischer (2005), labeling them as “Dangerous Sanctuaries” basically claim that 
humanitarian efforts can serve as a resource for conflict to re-escalate. As Anderson (1996) 
argues, the humanitarian aid at times of wars and violence might be detrimental as much as 
benignant.  Although the organizations can provide assistance and save lives, they can set 
the ground for violence by feeding insurgency groups to recollect power and upraise again. 
(Salehyan, 2014; Westerhout, 2005; Rudolph von Bernuth, 1996). 
These security concerns of states have first hand influence on the NGO operations; hence 
NGOs take the state perspective into consideration while they engage in humanitarian aid 
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initiatives. The organizations realize the political, economic and security related pressures 
on states and also the state tendency to politicize mass migration as a part of their agenda in 
both domestic and foreign policy making. Saleyhan (2014) sets the norm of how to 
formulate a balanced reflection to these sensitivities:  
Finding ways to constructively engage with legitimate state concerns while at the 
same time emphasizing the importance of humanitarian protection is vital. Thus, 
while refugee advocates must keep the spotlight on human rights, they must also be 
attuned to additional state motivations when designing advocacy strategies (p.275). 
That is why, NGOs cannot isolate themselves from the international politics. Their 
operations for human rights are directly affected by the factors such as the probability of 
spillover of conflicts, the type of refugees, the neighborhood of the conflict; other than their 
structural concerns of their own. The mostly conflicting interests of NGOs and 
governments place a considerable burden on their efforts and aggravate the suffering of 
refugees (Karadawi, 1983). For instance, NGOs may want to interact with a warring party 
for acquiring access to those in need of help; this would create an outrage from the 
government perspective considering that the organization reinforces the legitimacy claims 
of the so called “terrorists” (Von Bernuth, 1996).  
Considering all these limitation of NGOs to respond refugee crises, most organizations 
prefer to take advantage of their media linkages and resources in order to raise awareness 
ad invite various actors to cooperate and reach a humanitarian resolution. However, for the 
most part they are obligated to face the realpolitik of the international arena.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SYRIAN CASE 
 
 
“We have not seen a refugee outflow escalate at such a frightening rate  
since the Rwandan genocide almost 20 years ago.” 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
António Guterres8 
 
 
A Brief History of the Conflict and the Refugee Crisis Afterwards 
The breeze of the Arab Spring has been felt in Syria during the spring of 2011. The 
country-wide protests were responded by the government forces with the deployment of the 
Syrian army. Throughout 2012, the limited scope of the movement expanded and rapidly 
and created one of the long lasting, most violent and destructive carnage of our time. In the 
following years, the gradual decay of Syria begot a power vacuum and gave birth to the 
most perilous actor claiming to be the “caliphate”, the Islamic State; and this new player in 
the region further complicated the picture. The government induced violence to the extend 
of using chemical weapons on civilians, an armed response from the rebellions and the war 
within a war by the IS incited the mass migration and displacements which reached the one 
million threshold in 2013, according to the UNHCR. The exodus spread to the world at 
large, but the main destinations in the region were Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt 
(Crisp et al., 2013).  
As of 2016, the war has still been continuing and the death poll has hit almost 500,000 
(SCPR Report, 2015 9 ), Syrians are fleeing the country aimed at more industrialized 
countries, Europe in particular, to seek asylum and resettlement for the long run.  The 
UNHCR announces that in total 6.6 million people have become IDPs in Syria whereas 4.8 
                                                          
8 UNHCR Chief Urges States to Maintain Open Access for Fleeing Syrians’ (16 July 2013). 
9 Updated and estimated for 2016. The 2015 figure of the Report is 470,000.  
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million people have become asylum seekers in other countries. That means, more than 13 
million people of the 20.5 million pre-war Syrian population have been forced to leave their 
homes. More dramatically, irregular migration and human trafficking have taken lives of 
3,771 migrants in the Mediterranean, only for 2015 (IOM, 2016). The Syrian economy has 
shrunk by more than 50% in real terms since 2011 with average inflation being 51% 
(Butter, 2015). According to the Global Peace Index, Syria is now, the last peaceful country 
among the 162 countries (Estes, 2014). These figures are more than enough to make the 
Syrian conflict the largest refugee crises in magnitude throughout the world history 
(UNHCR, 2016).   
In fact, the Syrian society has mass migration in its history. After the independence from 
the French mandate in 1946, the military coups and instability in the country resulted with 
an exodus to Lebanon. Additionally, during 1960s, such a national identity understanding 
was adopted that almost 100,000 Kurds became stateless people; since they were coming 
from Turkey, which was not applicable to the territorial nationality description. 
Furthermore, the Hama Massacre in 1982 displaced Syrians to Lebanon again as a result of 
military operation to the Islamist insurgency (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012). These changes 
in the socio-ethnic structure made the region suitable for the other probable waves of 
migrants.  
To understand the background preparing the current human tragedy, it is possible to focus 
on the ethnic configuration of Syria which is a central component of the crisis. 
Demographically speaking, the dominant group in Syrian society is the Sunni Arabs which 
constitutes the 64% of population whereas the Alawites are 12%. On the other hand, Kurds 
are 10% of the population together with 9% Christians, 3% Druze and 1% Shia (Phillips, 
2015). The Assad administration has the control of the country since 1971 with Hafiz 
Assad taking over. The Alawite sect is closely linked with Shia and corollary its main 
supporter, Iran; inevitably, this ethnic nuance directly influences the power dynamics in the 
conflict. The rebels leading the fight against the government forces are mainly Sunnis. 
Being the majority in the country, the Sunnis have long been resentful against the minority 
government of Assad; however, some other groups in the society participated in the Free 
Syrian Army opposition to the Assad’s dictatorship (Adams, 2015). In fact, this is the 
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critical point of social and political grievance that the IS mostly taken advantage of. 
Recruiting its followers on sectarian bases, the organization pursues an extremist Sunni line 
and benefits from the fractions in the society and even in the region at large. Although the 
IS fights against the government, the rebels, the Kurds and El-Nusra in Syria; its militants 
organize terrorist attacks and suicide bombings all around the world and create a 
tremendous impact (Coen, 2015).  
The power dynamics and the proxy war nature of the Syrian conflict prevented outside 
military intervention. However, the anti-Western, anti-Christian extremism of the IS 
created the US-led coalition in September 2014 by combining forces of various countries 
against its territorial expansion in the region. Although it continues its operations by 
international recruits amounting to 25,000 foreign fighters and a revenue of $80 million10, 
military operations in Syria by the US-led coalition together with the Russian airstrikes 
pursued a containment policy against the IS (McCaul et. al, 2015). However, the military 
interventions are still multifaceted since parties engage in parallel combats; such as Russia 
bombs rebels together with IS but supports Assad; or Turkey supports rebels because they 
fight against the regime along with the IS.   
This complicated proxy war in Syria is not the only problem; conflicts in Afghanistan and 
Eritrea in addition to the war in Iraq are producing high numbers of refugees flowing into 
the same countries of the region such as Egypt or Turkey. More critically, both the Iraq and 
Syria crises harbor the largest refugee community of the world, the Palestinians. The 
protracted Israel-Palestine conflict has created the Palestinian Syrian population in Syria 
and now, they have to flee, as well (Fargues, 2014). This multiplicity of previous conflicts 
gives the current massive displacement multiple records other than the unprecedented 
magnitude. According to the UNHCR, the variety of destination countries have made 
Syrian exodus the highest level of migration from a single group fleeing to 44 
industrialized countries of the world since 1992 (Ostrand, 2015). Corollary, the migration 
routes of the refugees are confusingly diverse; other than the regional countries with land 
border, the EU routes are being discovered continuously. The land route passes through 
Turkey and reaches border countries of EU such as Greece or Bulgaria. Via the air route, 
                                                          
10 IHS Conflict Monitor Report, figures for the mid-2015.  
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the asylum seekers can directly fly an EU member state. For these two possible ways of 
reaching Europe, Syrians will either have to obtain visa or become irregular migrants if 
they do not obtain asylum. Although land and air routes are available as well, Syrians who 
does not have legal documentation for entry mostly have to use the sea route and enter 
illegally. For this detrimentally dangerous route, they have to pass through the 
Mediterranean in order to reach Greece or Italy mostly. (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012).  
From the perspective of national states, the variety of ways for illegal entry further 
complicates the picture. Among the highly overwhelmed regional countries, Lebanon hosts 
refugees with the highest capacity; since one out of every five people now is a Syrian 
refugee, according to UNHCR. In terms of magnitude, Turkey hosts the highest number of 
refugees, almost 2.8 million registered as of June 2016 (UNHCR, 2016). Jordan, on the 
other hand, hosts the third largest amount of Syrians with almost 700,000 in 2015, leaving 
Iraq (over 244,000) and Egypt (117,600) behind (UNHCR, 2016). The aforementioned 
regional countries mostly are having financial difficulties together with political 
instabilities. In Lebanon and Jordan, countries suffer from poverty and instability. Iraq, on 
the other hand, under the ISIS threat, have 3 million IDPs in addition to the Syrian 
refugees. Together with the massive influx, the situation becomes dire for refugees and the 
future of the countries. Most Syrians do not have access to provision of basic needs. More 
than 80% of refugees live urban areas rather than camps. The insufficient infrastructure 
hinders basic services such as health care, electricity or water. The host countries do not 
have the required absorption capacity to meet the necessities of the drastic increase in urban 
population growth (Ostrand, 2015).  
On top of economics, the influx changes the social equilibrium of the host as well; not only 
nations but also religious and ethnic communities are reshaped. Cutting over the national 
line of structuring, cultural affinities become prior to the political identity since people wish 
to return to the mundane pace of life from the crisis situations. Sunni Arabs or Shias, 
Christian Arabs or Muslim Kurds, they all seek for shelter and draw near to the similar 
communities to them. Inevitably, considering the magnitude of the flight, the social 
balances are changing gradually in the region (Fargues, 2014).  
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While the regional countries are struggling with these social, economic and political 
depression, more prosperous countries do not even offer a single resettlement; the 
following are some of them: United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Russia, Japan, China and India (Ostrand, 2015). On the western side, most border countries 
of the EU apply a systematic denial of entry for the Syrian asylum seekers. Only about 2% 
of asylum requests are resulted with grant of resettlement, according to UNHCR; and this 
phenomenal portion is shouldered by a few states. That is why, Canada and Germany have 
to resettle a disproportioned number of refugees with respect to other developed countries 
(Coen, 2015). 
On the other hand, the situation is not comforting in the Europe as well. The EU cannot 
develop a harmonious as a result of state reluctance to accept refugees. The IS factor is a 
critical determinant for this introvert European behavior. Most states close their borders to 
the ‘potential IS militants’. The EU external border countries such as Greece or Italy does 
not want to be the “prison of refuges” that aim to transit the country and reach the Northern 
European countries. Approximately 94% of Syrian asylum seekers trans pass Italy and 
continue towards north where they ask for asylum (Miller and Orchard 2014). The reason is 
that in order to claim asylum, they need to be physically present in the country or at the 
border reception plots (Ostrand, 2015). However, this creates the problem of illegal entry 
and comes with negative repercussions for the most refugees. The possible apprehensions 
for irregular Syrian migrants are arrest and detention, physical abuse and assault, or even 
being left in the sea (Amnesty International, 2015). The conditions in the reception 
facilities are describes as terrible; since asylum seekers are not able to work and do not get 
financial support (Miller and Orchard 2014).  
Syrians, facing the barriers of industrialized countries against the asylum requests, refer to 
what is called ‘complementary solutions’. Student visas, academic positions, private 
sponsorships, business investor positions, and family reunifications are some of these 
complementary ways to entering a European country for Syrians. These are preferred since 
they constitute a legal route for entry; even though they do not qualify for resettlement 
(Miller and Orchard 2014). Otherwise, Syrians who are not able to obtain these types of 
status have to refer to the aforementioned irregular or illegal border crossing routes.  
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When it comes to the responses from the international community, IGOs and NGOs in 
general, the picture is not pleasing as well. To begin with, for leading the intra-Syrian talks 
and a highly difficult resolution process, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had to 
appoint three UN-Arab League Special Representative for Syria; Kofi Annan (February-
August 2012), Lakhdar Brahmi (August 2012-May 2014) and Staffan de Mistura (July 
2014-now). The conundrum of the power dynamics, state-IO interactions and the difficulty 
of bringing state parties on the same table caused resignation of the previous mediators, 
leaving the incumbent one in a deeper predicament.  
On top of this, the Arab League peace plan, Geneva I-II-III talks in 2012, 2014 and 2016 
respectively, Vienna process are only some of the diplomatic and political processes 
initiated by various actors. More humanitarian-based in its structure and broader in its 
scope, the Syria Regional Response Plan of the UNHCR in 2014 united more than 155 
actors and collected about 2.3 billion dollars for its 2014 budget, although still insufficient 
for its targeted operations. This plan was targeting the major four destination neighboring 
countries. The United States being the top donor; the EU, Kuwait, Germany and Japan are 
some other contributors to the international response plan (Ostrand, 2015). For the 2015-
2016 period, the response plan was expanded in its scope and target; more than 200 actors 
of states and NGOs participated the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) in 
response to Syrian Crisis. Additionally, Egypt was also included in the countries of concern 
for the Plan (UNHCR, 2015). The EU, on the other hand, came up with the EU-Turkey deal 
as a way to deal with the refugee crisis since the problem was not resolved at the state level.  
Overall, the Syrian crisis is a clear example of the state and international level responses 
which is the central concern of this thesis. Deadlocks reached during the peace talks as well 
as the attempts to revitalize conflict resolution process are examples of the fine line 
between state actors and IOs. Although complicated, the general scene is close to the above 
description. However, a more detailed analysis of the actors’ attitude and the corollary 
response will be conducted in this chapter. First, the responses from state actors and factors 
determining the response will be discussed; then the international response will be the focus 
of the second part with the subcategories of IGOs and NGOs.  
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Figure 1. Refugee Movements in the Middle East as of 2016 
 
Source: UNHCR, 16 June 2016. 
Table 1. Number of Refugees in the Region 
Country 
Refugees in the Region 
16 June 2016 
Turkey 2,739,326 
Lebanon 1,48,275 
Jordan 655,217 
Iraq 247,339 
Egypt 117,702 
North Africa 29,275 
TOTAL 4,837,134 
 Source: UNHCR 
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2.1. Determinants of State-Level Responses to the Refugee Crisis 
 
“The common European asylum policy norms,  
a system of law that we have developed,  
is more an obstacle than a help.  
It would be better if the Member States  
could decide on their own as per their specialties 
how they want to stop the refugee waves.  
Should we get this possibility,  
then we Hungarians would be able to solve our own problems as well.”  
The Hungarian Prime Minister11 
 
The impacts of the 9/11 has been profound for the most part of policy making of Western 
states. For the refugees and migration realm, the incident has become a cornerstone which 
introduces securitization of refugees so that states ensure their border security. With the 
“security paradigm” prevailing the world at large, most states become inclined to evade 
international norms of R2P, non-refoulement and resettlement (Coen, 2015).  
This paradigm shift has directly been effective on actors’ responses to conflicts producing 
refugee crises. Mostly, refugees are labeled to be terrorists with missions and plans against 
the national interests of the country. The fact that perpetrators of the 9/11 were never 
involved in asylum or refugee status did not change the picture (Jones, 2015). States 
continued to othering of refugees regardless of the fact that the international law recognizes 
people fleeing their homes as refugees until their status is determined; not as terrorists or 
jihadists (Coen, 2015).  
This logic eminently applies for the Syrian case; the very first response of most states was 
to declare that they would not accept refugees who are possibly terrorists. The influence of 
the 9/11 or Iraqi invasion is visible in the political rhetoric as well; the Congressman from 
Texas Michael McCaul described the refugee resettlement program as “backdoor for 
                                                          
11 UNHCR Report on Hungary Asylum System, Transcript of interview with Prime Minister Orbán by Radio Kossuth. 
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jihadists” and “the jihadi pipeline” for extremist Islamic fighters (McCaul, 201512). this 
statement is an example from the US; however very similar arguments come every day 
from various politicians of other countries such as Slovakia13 accepting only Christians, 
Czech Republic14 writing numbers on the arms of deported Syrians, or Hungary15 building 
a fence.  
Other than seeing refugees as a threat, another state reflex to the Syrian refugees is about 
the probability of spillover in the region. This effect can be observed twofold; firstly, states 
perceive that Syrian refugees may constitute a threat through destabilizing the domestic 
politics and economy which will disrupt the government power. Second, refugees may 
cause escalation of some existing conflicts by adding new tensions between populations. 
That is why, states can be very reluctant to accept refugees (Miller and Orchard 2014). To 
illustrate, Israel, as a border country with Syria, it does not accept any refugees since there 
may be Syrian Palestinians among them; which would further escalate one of the most 
protracted conflict of our time.  
The state attitude, from a different point of view, has other repercussions in addition to the 
failure of international protection for refugees. Viewing it as a “revived cold war” 
Cockburn posits that the Syrian war is the Russian fight with Western powers using forces 
such as the Syrian regime, the Free Syrian Army or even the IS (2015). The 
operationalization of these actors by ‘the great powers’ can be in various forms ranging 
from provision of military or economic assistance, or vetoing a Security Council decision 
for intervention in Syria. Moreover, the bandwagoning that the war created prevents any 
rapprochement of the Middle Eastern powers since it polarizes forces like Syria and Iran on 
one side, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel on the other (Coen, 2015). Taking it one step 
further, Nasser-Eddine argues that the great powers are content with the situation no matter 
it prolongs the conflict: 
These nations are competing for access to the region's resources. Their national 
interests will manifest in many ways, including the shifting of alliances. For these 
                                                          
12 WND Exclusive, “Syrian refugee program called 'back door for jihadists'”. 
13 The Independent, “Slovakia will only accept Christian migrants”. 
14 The Independent, “Czech police haul migrants off trains to Germany and 'write numbers on their arms in ink'”. 
15 The Independent, “Migrant crisis: The walls Europe is building to keep people out”. 
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reasons the application of R2P will fail where security and national interests of 
powers are at stake (2012, p.17). 
As the literature on the refugees suggests that states value the foreign policy position of the 
sender country when they are making asylum decisions; despite the rhetoric on the human 
rights and international law (Saleyhan, 2014). Attitudes of states to the Syrian refugee crisis 
constitutes a powerful support for this theory; most states do not accept refugees since they 
are allied with the Syrian government; whereas the states accepting refugees do perceive 
the obligation to develop an anti-regime rhetoric for discrediting the Assad regime of Syria.  
The Syrian refugee crisis highlights the merit of the claim of this thesis that state interests 
are central to the state actions, even at times of humanitarian crisis. Competition for 
resources and achievement of strategic goals precedes the responsibility to protect. 
Thereby, it becomes ordinary that humanitarian aid and intervention are used as a tool of 
state machine for realizing national interests. As Khashanah explores the Syrian crisis in 
similar terms by saying that “the humanitarian intervention doctrine risks being viewed as a 
pretext for intervention to achieve neo-colonial or geopolitical objectives in a new world 
order” (2014, p.18).  
In this section, the responses of a selected group of states are analyzed in detail with the 
purpose of understanding the determinants of their approach to the Syrian refugee crisis. In 
order to develop further on factors that shape the balance between abiding by international 
norms and realist policy making, examples of Turkey, Canada, Germany and Hungary are 
analyzed below. The reasoning of this line of country selection is embedded in the nature of 
crisis itself; as a result of certain characteristics of the conflict, some countries have 
negative or positive incentives to accept or refuse asylum applications. That is to say, the 
case selection is based on the policy line followed by the state; whether it pursues a refugee 
friendly policy or not and what is the extend of this friendliness. Turkey, Canada and 
Germany are applied as a focal point for the analysis since they accept and resettle 
relatively higher numbers of Syrian refugees and mostly recognized as refugee-friendly 
states; Germany being the European benchmark (Ostrand, 2015). The Hungarian case is 
selected because of the heated opposition of the government to refugee relocations of the 
EU and other regulations with regards to asylum applications.  
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The lack of time and space does not allow a comprehensive analysis of the all states; 
however, these four countries overall sufficiently represent mostly the policies and actions 
of the other states of the world. After the state level analysis, the following parts will 
discuss international responses under the subtitles of IGO responses and the one from 
NGOs in the last section.  
2.1.1. Turkey 
The central state which has the longest border with Syria and an influential actor in the 
region, Turkey, is the country which hosts the highest number of refugees in the world with 
2.8 million registered Syrian refugees. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in March 
2011, Syrians began to run away from the violence and asked asylum in Turkey (Durukan 
et al., 201516). The real number of Syrian refugees in Turkey is a matter of discussion as a 
result of the argument that most Syrians in Turkey are not registered through the legal 
documentations; but it is assumed to be exceeding 3 million (ECHO Factsheet, 201617). 
However, only the registered 2.8 million is sufficient to rank Turkey as the top refugee host 
country in the world (UNHCR, 201618). 
At the initial phase, the number of crossing the Turkish border was not more than 300; 
however, the Turkish government announced it as a mass influx and operationalized the 
necessary mechanisms. From that point on, the Syrians wishing to cross the Turkish border 
were accepted and provided with the access to the basic needs; but they were not 
considered to be refugees. Accepted as the ‘guests’, Turkish authorities granted temporary 
protection to Syrians who want to live in Turkey (Durukan et al., 2015).  
The logic behind the temporary protection status is about the way Turkey has signed the 
1951 Refugee Protocol and Convention. The geographical reservation that Turkey has 
maintained enables it to discriminate between refugees on the country of origin; Turkey 
only admits refugees from Europe as conventional refugees. That is why, Turkey only 
grants asylum to the non-Western people under the category of temporary protection 
(Kirisci and Içduygu, 2009).  
                                                          
16 AIDA, “Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Turkey”.  
17 ECHO, “Factsheet on Turkey: Refugee Crisis”.  
18 UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response”.  
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The framework of today’s Turkish asylum procedure for Syrians is based on this 
geographical limitation principle. Upon the abrupt exodus in from Syria in 2011, Turkey’s 
Minister of Interior announced the fundamental basis of applying the temporary protection 
as followed: 
1. Turkey’s borders shall remain open to persons seeking to cross the border to seek 
safety in Turkey; 
2. No persons from Syria shall be sent back to Syria against their will; and 
3. Basic humanitarian needs of the persons arriving from the conflict in Syria shall 
be met (Durukan et al., 2015).   
With this kind of a bounded structure, Syrians have legal permission to state in Turkey; 
they are not exposed to the fear of refoulement and they have access to basic needs, 
although limited. In fact, this the way that Turkey was able to develop the immediate 
absorption capacity required for the massive amount of refugees. In the summer of 2012, 
the numbers exceeded the 100,000 mark (Durukan et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, the legal framework of the Turkish temporary protection system for 
Syrians is described as political discretion, differential inclusion and improvisation. The 
reasoning they provide is that the prima face nature of temporary protection does not 
consider individual cases That is why, the protection system lacks many essential needs for 
security of the individual in the long term; such as job provision, educational benefits and 
integration. They experience precarity of citizenship rights in a situation of ambiguity that 
produces concerns for the long run (Baban, 2016; Durukan et al., 2015)., 
State-IGO Interactions: The EU-Turkey Deal 
The Turkish response has an international dimension as well. The overwhelming scale of 
the influx, the tragedy of illegal entrants in the Mediterranean and the reluctance individual 
Member States to accept refugees put considerable pressures on the EU obliged the 
organization to act. The most preferred solution for the EU and Member States would be 
containment of the influx, at least along the EU borders. As a result, At the end of 2013, the 
EU has signed a deal with Turkey in Ankara with the ostensible purpose of ending human 
trafficking in the Mediterranean. The deal declares that all irregular migrants arriving the 
EU member states after the determined deadline, March 20, will be returned to Turkey. On 
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the other hand; for each Syrians returned, another Syrians from Turkey will be resettled in 
the EU directly (Powell, 2016). The EC explains the official purpose of the deal: 
The aim is to replace disorganized, chaotic, irregular and dangerous migratory flows 
by organized, safe and legal pathways to Europe for those entitled to international 
protection in line with EU and international law (EC Factsheet, 201619).   
The deal relies on the readmission schemes of Turkey with the countries of concern, mainly 
Greece. The two country have signed a readmission agreement in 2002 and will continue 
with the existing framework. With the provision of financial support from the EU 
resources, Turkey has prepared the ground for the deal. It increased the border security with 
the EU states with external borders and it created centers for accepting and sending 
refugees between the EU. Additionally, Turkey will provide assistance to prevention of 
irregular migration through the sea and land routes to the EU. Intrinsically, The Frontex 
and the EASO support was strengthened in order to support the implementation of the deal 
(Baban, 2016).  
In return for these, primarily, Turkey will receive financial assistance to the amount of €3 
billion for Facilities for Refugees in Turkey. At the second phase, an additional fund of 
another €3 billion will be made available to Turkey until the end of 2018. On the other 
hand, Turkey is promised with the fulfilment of the long-desired visa liberalization for the 
Turkish citizens around the Schengen area. Moreover, the EU accession process for Turkey 
will be re-energized at an accelerating pace (EC, 201620). 
However, these promises are conditioned with the realization of necessary requirements 
which amounted to 72 criteria at the time of deal. Turkey was quick enough to realize all of 
them but 5; which led to protraction of visa liberalization. Not surprisingly, this 
disappointment resulted in a temporary suspension of the deal for an unknown period of 
time. Nevertheless, according to Donald Tusk, the European Council President, the 
agreement was successful in the realization of the goal for reducing the number of refugees 
at the doors of Europe21. 
                                                          
19 EC Factsheet, “Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement”.  
20 EC, “EU-Turkey Statement - 18 March 2016”.  
21 BBC, “Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal is 'working'”. 
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However, a heated discussion emerges from the point of the EU-Turkey deal that refugees 
will be returned to Turkey since Turkey is a “safe third country”. This safe country 
assumption of the deal is considered to be ‘too optimistic’, to be politically correct. 
According to the safe country description of the EU regulations from the Asylum 
Procedures Directive and the international law, a country is safe 
 When there is a democratic system and generally and consistently 
 No persecution  
 No torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment  
 No threat of violence  
 No armed conflict (EC, 201622) 
The ground is open for discussion on whether Turkey is a safe country or not. The current 
protection regime in Turkey for Syrians, in fact, do not qualify the convention criteria that 
refugees will not be returned back to a country where they have reasonable fear of 
persecution. Also the ongoing situation in terms of violence and terrorism do not meet the 
criteria of ‘no threat of violence’. Additionally, the Turkish authorities do not provide 
refugee status to Syrians thanks to the geographical reservation to the 1951 Convention; 
and they do not accept to promote to the full adoption of the Convention criteria (Collet, 
2016). Nevertheless, the EU has sat on the table with Turkey and signed the deal, not 
necessarily focusing on the legal criteria; because the main concern of the deal was to 
contain refugees in Turkey (Miller and Orchard, 2014).  
Another criticism to the deal is that it is exceedingly pragmatic from the perspectives of 
both EU and Turkey for such a humanitarian crisis (Heisbourg, 2015). Similar to many 
other opponents of the deal, Crisp regards the deal as another way to curtail the exodus of 
the refugees to the EU. He likens the deal to other pragmatic precautions such as 
establishment of so called ‘safe zones’, ‘offshore processing agreements’ or ‘migration 
management’. All are aimed to discourage the actual entry of asylum seekers to the 
industrialized countries (2016). At this point, international organizations such as the 
UNHCR and EU are heavily criticized on legitimizing the actions and providing legal ways 
for states to apply refoulement (Greenhill, 2016).  
                                                          
22 EC, “An EU Safe Countries of Origin List”.  
   
42 
 
The threat of refoulement and evasion from R2P is more visible in individual state 
responses. Turkey, in particular, is a country experiencing a win-win situation in multiple 
fronts during this refugee crisis (Greenhill, 2016). First of all, it has the upper hand against 
the EU on the negotiation table. As a country being relatively more prosperous than the 
other regional hosts, the Turkish President can easily threaten Europe by canceling the deal 
and releasing all Syrians who wish to be in Europe: “We can open the doors to Greece and 
Bulgaria anytime… So how will you deal with refugees if you don't get a deal? Kill the 
refugees? 23” Secondly, apparent in this Erdogan quote, Turkey can benefit from the refugee 
hosting for its domestic politics as well; Turkish hospitality as opposed to the European 
ignorance contributes to the image of the government of being self-sufficient and humane. 
Europe’s desperate need for Turkey as a “waiting room” (Wilczek, 201624) for refugees, 
together with Turkey’s well-awareness of its leverages seem to further complicate the 
picture in the future (Greenhill, 2016).  
2.1.2. Canada 
The liberal government of Canada, with the support of about 68% of society, adopted a 
very refugee-friendly line of policy making (Nanos Survey, 2016 25 ). Thanks to the 
governmental leadership of the process, the total number of resettlement or similar ways of 
admission granted to Syrians applicants by Canada is 48,089, as of April 2016. For only 
2015, Canada admitted more than 25,000 Syrian refugees. Also they plan to resettle a 
considerable number of refugees until the end of 2017. In terms of resettlement numbers, 
Canada is the country resettling the highest number of refugees together with Germany 
(UNHCR, 201626). 
The Citizenship and Immigration in Canada Department conducts a comprehensive 
analysis of the refugee profile and its compatibility with the Canadian communities. They 
conclude that the existing 40,840 resident of Syrian origins before 2011 are able to provide 
an essential emotional and social support for the refugees of the Syrian civil war. Overall, 
                                                          
23 Reuters, “Turkey's Erdogan threatened to flood Europe with migrants: Greek website”. 
24 The Spectator, “When the EU is no longer able to bribe Turkey, the blackmail will begin” 
25 The Globe and Mail-Nanos Survey, “Canadians’ impressions of the governments response to Syrian refugee crisis””.  
26 UNHCR, “Resettlement and Other Admission Pathways for Syrian Refugees as of 29 April 2016”. 
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the Government of Canada allocated $678 million for the costs of the resettlement program 
for Syrians (Government Documents, 201627). 
The Canadian government works with the several hundred IRCC organizations for 
developing an effective response to the who they call “Government-assisted refugees”. 
Also the government administer an Urgent Protection Program for specifically targeting the 
vulnerable populations such as women. Through the responsible communities and 
government support, refugees are resettled either by state intervention or by private 
sponsors. Additionally, with the large scale influx, the government decided to restore its 
healthcare program for the refugees (Government of Canada, 201628). 
Moreover, the attitude of Canadians towards refugee resettlement is considered to be 
influential even on other societies. The National Refugee Welcome Board of the United 
Kingdom, Tim Finch openly states the perception of Canada by saying that “It is an 
inspiration to us. If Canada can do it, there’s no reason why we shouldn’t. Refugee 
advocates here look at Canada and think, ‘if only’29” 
Canada is a country which uses immigration friendly policies as its unique selling point and 
holds a reputation for it. Accordingly, the open-door policy of the Canadian government for 
the Syrians relies on credibility of a sophisticated selection mechanism for determination of 
the refugees to be resettled in Canada. Working with the UNHCR on initial selection from 
Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, granting refugee status to Syrians is an elaborate and 
comprehensive five-step process. Canada works closely with the UNHCR and its personnel 
who has field experiences from the Middle East region. More essentially, the applications 
are processed individually and cases are assessed by various offices in order to prevent 
leaking of terrorists or kind. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service is one of these 
offices which runs the applicant’s information in the databases of allied countries. Overall, 
this mechanism is considered to be effective enough to minimize the security threat while 
accepting asylum applications to a certain extent (The Government of Canada, 201530).    
                                                          
27 The Citizenship and Immigration in Canada Department, “Population Profile: Syrian Refugees”. 
28 Website of the Government of Canada.   
29 The Star newspaper, “Canada ‘an inspiration’ on Syrian refugee resettlement”. 
21 Canada Global News, “How to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees: A step-by-step guide”.  
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From the security perspective, which is popular with the existing terrorism threat, most 
experts agree that Canadians are not scared of refugees being a threat to Canada thanks to 
the meticulous selection process. In fact, it becomes easier to enter Canada as a tourist 
rather than applying for asylum or resettlement; leaving almost no room for terrorist entry 
through the asylum corridor (Nanos Survey, 2016).  
2.1.3. Germany 
 
“The world sees Germany as a country of hope and opportunity, 
 that was not always the case” 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel31 
 
Among the European countries, Germany is the country leading the response of the EU in 
general (Miller and Orchard, 2014). German response is an incisive illustrator of the central 
argument of this thesis that the state outruns authority of the supranational institution. With 
the influx of hundreds of Syrians, Germany has unilaterally ignored the Dublin regulation 
by announcing that it will accept all refugees from Syria coming from the Balkans on 24 
August 2015 (Heisbourg, 2015). According to the Dublin regulation, Germany should have 
return refugees to the first country of asylum to process the asylum claim (Council 
Regulation, 2003). It is not only the Dublin regulations that the German government turns a 
deaf ear; the setbacks of the regional elections against the anti-refugee party AFD did not 
change the Merkel’s course of actions32.  
The opposition from the AFD as well as from Merkel’s own party, the CDU, could not 
change the welcoming culture (Wilkommenskultur) of Germany to prevail. Grant of asylum 
or refugee status for Germany meant that with the provision of a temporary residence 
permit, asylum seekers will be treated with the equal status of a citizen of German state in 
terms of social and economic benefits together with the support for the process of 
integration (Miller and Orchard 2014). 
                                                          
31 NY Times, “Angela Merkel Calls for European Unity to Address Migrant Influx”. 
32 The Guardian, “Merkel refuses to abandon refugee policy despite election setbacks”. 
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Understandable enough, it is a cyclical situation; as the level of welfare offered for refugees 
increases, the number of asylum seekers who wish to move Germany rises rapidly. Today, 
Germany is the top destination for the Syrian asylum seekers among the European states 
(See the appendix 1). Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, about 355,000 asylum 
applications were made to Germany; which is more than the total applications to the rest of 
the EU countries. With the 42,063 refugees resettled, Germany has the highest resettlement 
numbers of the world (UNHCR, 2016; see appendix 1). Moreover, Germany is one of the 
largest contributors to the Syrian crisis by its pledge of 2.3 billion euros until 2018 
(German Federal Government, 2016).  
Germany has been highly criticized to move unilaterally during the refugee crisis, 
disrupting the multilateral nature of the EU. Looking at the general picture of the 
organization, an integrated EU response is more difficult, now. Integration itself, day by 
day, is becoming an obscure phenomenon for today’s EU, especially with the Brexit taking 
place, unexpectedly to the most. Therefore, states such as Germany, which aim to maintain 
sovereignty and autonomy presume that they have to move individually:  
 Indeed, by responding to the refugee crisis independently, Germany has shown the 
 way to purely national responses by others. This can turn into a downward spiral: an 
 integrated EU response is made more difficult as a result of go-it-alone policies; and 
 the resulting absence of a convincing EU response will lead Germany and others to 
 further act on their own initiative, thus fueling souverainiste forces overall 
 (Heisbourg, 2015). 
The EU-Turkey deal and the performance of Chancellor Merkel for realization of the plan 
had negative repercussions among the member states. Mostly governments of the EU states 
thought that German unilateral incentive was a breach to the cooperation and consultation 
principle of the union.  Especially, on top of the German attitude during the euro crisis, the 
breach of the Dublin Regulation since the beginning of the crisis, was a fundamental 
problem from the perspective of member states as a disincentive to remain and act as a 
union. Actions and policies of Germany have strengthened the skepticism towards German 
commitment to the EU rules and principles (Heisbourg, 2015).   
For the most part of the response to the massive influx, Germany set the ground for its 
unilateral intervention to the crisis, assuming a kind of a leadership with its soft power. 
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This kind of power turned out to be essential for the integration of the organization after the 
euro crisis. Germany, assuming the soft power role as a counter-extremist force, behave as 
a peacemaker for greater power acquisition of the EU. Likening it to the vertical power of 
Moscow’s Kremlin, Heisbourg posits that Germany’s horizontal power is considered to be 
an integrating force for the EU (2015). However, the recent developments and more 
importantly the Brexit decision will certainly change the balances in terms of responding 
the refugee crisis as well. The integratory power of Germany or any other state for the EU 
lost a considerable level of power and reputation.  
2.1.4. Hungary 
 “The questions asked are the most important issues,  
as these are in contradiction with the rules of the 
European Union in force today,  
these are silly rules, in force today, which paralyse the Member States.” 
The Hungarian Prime Minister33 
 
Hungary is one of the most aggressive states that follows an anti-refugee discourse among 
the EU member states. According to the UNHCR, Hungary has received 30 pledges for 
‘Resettlement and Other Forms of Legal Admission’ until March 2016. This figure is the 
lowest after Belarus (20), Romania (20) and then Lichtenstein (25) (UNHCR, 201634). 
More detrimental than the resettlement figure, the attitude and actions of the Hungarian 
government, the Prime Minister in particular, takes the lead on the hostility towards Syrian 
refugees. In September 2015, Hungary has built a fence along the border with Serbia in 
order to keep refugees and asylum seekers out; it is now preparing another fence on the 
Romanian border to further secure its border35.  
A more dramatic situation than the rhetoric is the criminalization of the border crossing in 
Hungary. Certain acts that most asylum seekers have to engage in to claim asylum are 
considered to be breaking laws and penalized. Moreover, allegations are not dropped even 
if the individuals claim that they were seeking asylum during their hearings at courts. From 
                                                          
33 UNHCR Report on Hungary Asylum System, Transcript of interview with Prime Minister Orbán by Radio Kossuth 
34 UNHCR, “Resettlement and Other Admission Pathways for Syrian Refugees as of 29 April 2016”. 
35 WSJ, “Hungary to Build Razor-Wire Fence on Romania Border to Stop Migrants”. 
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the Hungarian perspective, international protection and crime are separate issues; thus those 
engaging in the crime of border crossing and breaching the fence are considered to be 
criminals and sentenced to prison. The authorities punished more than 100 people for this 
crime; more than 1,000 people are kept in detention centers or put in prison (UNHCR, 
2015). 
The UNHCR regards Hungary’s law and practice with respect to criminalization of asylum 
seekers and hence prosecuting them for irregular entry through the fence in the border is 
not compatible with the international as well as the EU law (Pardavi et al., 2015). António 
Guterres, The High Commissioner, underlines that he was “shocked and saddened” when 
witnessing Syrian refugee families prevented from border crossing by using tear gas and 
water cannons. These kind of acts against the refugees are legitimized with the amendment 
to the Criminal Code which established unauthorized border crossing as a crime punishable 
up to ten years of prison (UNHCR, 201536).  
For the refugees who were able to somehow get through the border fence, the situation is 
not better. The refugees waiting for protection at the borders are living in dire conditions in 
where they call the “transit zones”. These are the places in which the asylum application is 
supposed to be submitted; however, the UNCHR does not find the conditions in these 
reception facilities and the asylum procedure in accordance with the international standards, 
leaving the EU standards aside. Refugees in the transit zones are not provided with shelter 
or enough food; when they protested for access to the basic needs, the police responded 
with tear gas. Moreover, the right for judicial review part, in particular, is critically 
problematic. The UNHCR holds evidences of legal obstructions to the asylum seeking 
procedure and review requests for declined applications; they shortened the maximum days 
a refugee can stay in the transit zone. Not surprisingly, the applicants mostly did not ask for 
judicial review after the parliamentary decision to reduce the time limit of detention to 30 
days. Furthermore, the Hungarian government is closing down some reception centers 
without running any need assessments. (UNHCR, 201537).  
                                                          
36UNHCR, “Hungary as a Country of Asylum”. 
37 UNHCR, “Hungary as a Country of Asylum”. 
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Another problematic issue is related with the safe country definition of Hungary. As a 
result of the deficiencies in its asylum system, the UNHCR announced that Serbia is not 
considered to be a safe third country. However, Hungary continued to accept Serbia as a 
safe third country; thus the UNHCR called states operating under the Dublin regulations 
not to return refugees or asylum seekers to Hungary. They continued to assume Serbia as a 
safe country until the end of 2015. Additionally, there is no common list of safe countries 
according to the EU criteria. If a state decides to accept a country as a safe country, that 
state has the responsibility to continuously review the conditions in the presumed safe 
country and adjust the decision accordingly. The state keeps the authority to change its 
decision after observing serious human rights violations and danger for the returning 
refugees.  
EU and the UNHCR tried to warn Hungary via various ways; but they could not interfere 
with the situation. The EC Human Rights Commissioner underlined the concerns about the 
legislative restrictions for refugees, criminalization of asylum seekers, conditions of the 
transit zones and problems of judicial review. Also the obvious breach of the non-
refoulement with the return of refugees to Serbia is highly criticized38. Also other IGOs and 
NGOs used naming and shaming functions to attract attention to the human rights abuses in 
Hungary. Nevertheless, all warnings remained unanswered; on the contrary, the 
government further restricted the asylum policies by reforming the asylum system with a 
shift towards a more rigid scheme. The current system brings mechanisms that discourage 
new refugee influx as well as exacerbating the services provided to the existing refugees 
(UNHCR, 2016).  
All in all, Hungary does not abide by its responsibilities and liabilities under the EU Return 
Directive as well as the Schengen Border Code. The UNHCR warned Hungary on “limiting 
and deterring access to asylum in the country” (2016). However, the Hungarian authorities 
consider that what they are doing is actually what is needed for the Europe; the Prime 
Minister posits that: 
We believe that what is at stake at present is Europe, the European lifestyle, and the 
survival or disappearance of European values and nations or their alteration beyond 
                                                          
38 UNHCR Press Release, “Hungary urged to refrain from policies and practices that promote intolerance and hatred”. 
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recognition. We must not let this happen, as then we would lose our identity; 
without a firm identity, there can be no success – either in economic or cultural 
senses39. 
As apparent in the Prime Minister’s words, the Hungarian response is centrally realist in 
that it refuses to accept any solutions that makes Hungary an insecure country. The political 
rhetoric of state officials is the result of social perception of Syrian refugees as a threat to 
national security. The reaction of the Hungarian state can also be regarded as self-defense; 
which is a clear demonstrator of the primacy of security for actors over any phenomenon, 
even humanitarian tragedies.  
2.2. Determinants of International Responses to the Refugee Crisis 
 
“All the values for which we stand, and all the reasons  
for which the United Nations exists, are at stake across 
 the devastated landscape that is Syria today.  
The time is long past for the international community,  
in particular, the Security Council, to uphold its responsibilities.” 
Ban Ki-moon40 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 
 
The response from the international organizations to the Syrian conflict and the refugee 
crisis has been mostly financial. The UN and EU have put considerable efforts to raise the 
necessary support for the regional response operations in the neighboring countries. 
Although most states are reluctant to accept refugees, they are more willing to contribute 
the effort financially. The USA, the UK and Germany are the largest single-country 
contributors to the humanitarian aid for the Syrian conflict.  Among the European countries 
Sweden was the next biggest donor after Germany, leaving the UK aside for now. Also 
Canada contributed with a considerable amount to the effort. Other than the western donors 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Japan contributed to the humanitarian assistance provided to the 
neighboring states in the region (Ostrand, 2015). 
                                                          
39 Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office, “Hungary’s Situation in the Context of Modern-Day Mass Migration”. 
40 UN, Secretary-General's address at The Asia Society: "Crisis in Syria: Civil War, Global Threat". 
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As of July 2016, the exact total of the UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan 
Funding is $1,380,064,478. However, all those funding flowing from various countries and 
regions of the world constitute no more than the 30% of the total fund required for 
developing an effective response to the crisis. Most operations are on the brink of failure, 
leaving numerous people living under the poverty line (UNHCR, 2016).  
The EU, between 2011 and 2016, contributed to the humanitarian relief operations by more 
than 5 billion euros (ECHO, 201641). Part of this fund is allocated through the EU’s 
Regional Trust Fund, also called “The Madad Fund” which was established with the 
attempt of Germany in the late 2014. These funding has been channeled to particularly 
neighboring countries Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq (Ostrand, 2015; Hoel, 2015). As 
mentioned earlier, the EU promised to commit with €3+€3 to Turkey upon the realization 
of the agreement (EC, 201642).  
Other than the financial aid to humanitarian operations, the contribution from the 
international organizations has been limited to the extend that the state actors left the 
ground for the IOs. In the below sections, the responses from the international 
organizations will be evaluated under two subsections: intergovernmental organizations and 
non-governmental organizations. 
 
2.2.1. Intergovernmental Organizations  
 
 
 “Today we are witnessing a debate between two Europes:  
a Europe willing to move and change the status quo,  
ready to confront an epochal challenge in the right way;  
and a Europe of walls and ostriches,  
ready to dump its problems on its neighbors  
in the hope that the crisis will solve itself.” 
 
President of the European Parliament 
Martin Schulz43 
                                                          
41 ECHO Factsheet, “Syrian Crisis”.  
42 EC, “EU-Turkey Statement - 18 March 2016”. 
43 The Washington Post, “Don’t blame Europe for the refugee crisis”. 
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The European Union 
Historically speaking, Europe, the European Union in particular, has been the address of 
the first experimentation of a consolidated refugee system after the WWI massive influx. 
However, with the globalization of the refugee problem, as Jessica Rodger puts, a 
“dramatic turnaround” was also experienced by the European Union; when Member States 
gradually have become anti-refugee policy adopters and initiated attempts for changing the 
existing refugee systems of Europe. These resentments resulted in various proposals for 
policy changes at both organizational level and state levels. (2001).  
Specifically, with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the total number of the refugees 
arrived at the doors of Europe and seek asylum is 1,037,760 between April 2011-April 
2016. The numbers continue to rise, although considerably lower than the exodus to the 
neighboring countries; only the 10% of the Syrians fleeing the country is able to reach 
Europe and seek for international protection there (UNHCR, 2016). As of December 2015, 
281,200 Syrians applications were resulted with a positive decision and grant of asylum; 
meaning that the rest of the applications is in progress, rejected or in detention center still 
waiting (Eurostat, 201644, for the expanded list, Appendix 3).  
Understanding the European response to the crisis requires a thorough comprehension of 
the concepts of irregular and illegal migration; since there is a fine line between the two 
which is often manipulated by the state logic. Irregular migrants are individuals who 
crosses borders of a country in defiance of the laws and regulations of that country (Ghosh, 
1998). Among these people, there might be individuals with genuine needs of protection 
and refugee status; hence they cannot be considered or punished as criminals (Miller 
Orchard and, 2014).  
Illegal migration, however, is another type of illegal entry to a country. The difference is 
evident when the components of human trafficking or smuggling are observed. According 
to the UN Protocol, trafficking in persons is "The recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
                                                          
44 Eurostat, Data from “First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data”.  
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coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of 
a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation" (2000, Article 
3(a) 45 ). On the other hand, smuggling is defined by the same UN Protocol as "The 
procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, 
of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national or a 
permanent resident”. These acts can take place inter-state and intra-state. Although there is 
no international consensus on definitions in general, the illegal migrants are considered to 
be entering through these kind of acts based on exploitation (Perruchoud, 2004).  
European institutional system for asylum seekers massive migrant crisis has been 
developed and ameliorated since 1990s; however, establishment of a fair burden sharing 
mechanism among the Member States and prevention of human trafficking are still 
troublesome issues. Today, the tendency of some states to procrastinate the R2P and not to 
welcome refugees depends on this insufficient monitoring of cooperation (Dumont and 
Scarpetta, 201546). The EU legal framework, although it abides by the aforementioned 1951 
UN Convention and Protocol, it creates additional mechanisms that gives incentives to 
states to avoid from granting rights of asylum to persons who need. In articular, by 
accepting that rejection at border is not refoulement, the EU legal system leaves the room 
for actors that intend to circumvent the humanitarian law and allow states to return refugees 
to third countries (Miller and Orchard, 2014).  
For the Syrian refugee crisis, the official response to the refugee crisis from the EU can be 
assumed to be started with the presidency of Mr. Jonker; he has put the crisis in this agenda 
for the elections by clearly stating the problem and implying the necessity of avoiding free 
riding of individual states on the common asylum system: 
On the basis of our shared values, we need to protect those in need through a strong 
common asylum policy. The newly agreed common asylum system has to be fully 
implemented, and divergences in national implementation removed (201447). 
                                                          
45 UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime. 
46 OECD, “Is this humanitarian migration crisis different?” 
47 A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change, Jean-Claude Juncker 
Candidate for President of the European Commission. 
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The main claim of this thesis is supported strongly with the fact that the Member States are 
highly reluctant, even gainsayer for some cases, to participate in the burden sharing 
mechanism offered by the EU for dealing with the refugee crisis. Some post-communist 
members revealed their reluctance to involve by first asserting their economic troubles and 
relative poverty; and then officially alienating the refugees with religious discrimination. 
For instance, the Slovakian Interior Ministry officially stated that “In Slovakia, we don’t 
have mosques, we only want to choose the Christians” (201548). Also an opposition party 
leader Kaczyński claimed that refugees carry “various types of parasites” in his election 
campaign in Poland (2015; quoted from Heisburg, 2015, p.17). More essential than the 
xenophobic attitude of some states, the policy line followed is more detrimental for the 
Union’s coalescence for the long term (Heisbourg, 2015). Apart from the Union’s 
regulations, some countries may even prefer not to follow the customary international law 
that is legally binding in terms of provision of international protection (Akkaya, 2015). 
Being the world leaders of European states, they mostly opted for containing the crisis to 
the regional states by easily supporting the neighbor hosts financially, and even that is 
inadequate for an effective response (Miller and Orchard, 2014). 
However, there are certain mechanisms under the EU umbrella that particularly address the 
refugee and asylum applications; additionally, some other existing institutions are 
strengthened with the aim of dealing with the current crisis effectively. Some of the 
revisions, according to EC (201549) are on the following institutions:  
 The Asylum Procedures Directive to increase the quality and duration of asylum 
applications,  
 The Reception Conditions Directive to ameliorate physical and legal conditions for 
asylum seekers in reception centers,  
 The Qualification Directive to clarify the scope of asylum and international 
protection  
 The Dublin Regulation to monitor State failures to abide by the international 
protection regulations. 
The Dublin regulation, and the three versions of it, is designed for the EU states to 
determine the country that will be hold responsible for the assessment of the asylum claim 
                                                          
48 The Washington Post, “Slovakia will take in 200 Syrian refugees, but they have to be Christian”. 
49 EC, “Common European Asylum System”. 
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and will manage the procedures of asylum transfers, if necessary. The central issue of this 
system is that the country responsible for the asylum application evaluation is expected to 
monitor the host country in case of prosecution targeted to the asylum seeker after the 
transfer (Miller and Orchard, 2014).  
The revision of the Dublin regulation is essential for the claims of this thesis since what is 
planned to be changed is the rule of first country of entry. In the previous version of Dublin 
system, the processing of the asylum application was the responsibility of the Member 
country through which the asylum seeker made her entry to the EU. The asylum seekers 
cannot determine the country of proceeding the asylum application. The reasoning for this 
was explained that leaving refugees determine the country of asylum results in problems at 
the implementation phase as a situation described by the EC as “asylum shopping” such 
that some countries offer more attractive asylum systems and refugees prefer them (EC, 
201650). 
Naturally, the Syrian crisis and the mass exodus of refugees to Europe created a situation 
that almost all asylum applications have to be reviewed by a few countries 
disproportionately. Also in the current situation, because of the fact that refugees do not 
generally foresee a resolution in Syria for the short run, the regulations are not sufficient to 
prevent refugees from choosing the country of asylum. They opt for illegal entry and try to 
avoid fingerprinting and trans pass the countries to reach the country in which they desire 
to be granted asylum. Inevitably, this paves the way for human traffickers and smugglers to 
abuse more numbers of people. Thereby, some member states are getting more popular 
destinations for the asylum applications and the pressure on these destinations increase in 
time. Furthermore, other than the number of refugees admitted, there is variation among the 
EU countries on the status granted for the asylum seeker. Countries such as Germany and 
Sweden grants the refugee status with social rights and benefits equal to a German citizen; 
whereas majority of other EU countries provide subsidiary protection or complementary 
forms or protection rather that granting refugee status, according to UNHCR data (201451, 
Fargues, 2014). 
                                                          
50 EC, “The Reform of the Dublin System”. 
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In order to ease the burden on the external border countries and standardize the asylum 
applications, the unsustainable part of the Dublin system is being reformed such that a fair 
burden sharing mechanism among the Member States can be formulated. With this reform, 
the expectation is that other inactive states also take part in the response at times of massive 
influxes that overwhelm the capacities of certain countries. (EC, 201652).  
In addition to the Dublin System, the creation of Frontex in 2004 was an additional level of 
external border protection on top of the state border protection. During the Syrian refugee 
crisis, Frontex increased its operations in order to respond to the irregular entries; these 
operations and tighter controls at the borders since 2013 have reduced the number of 
unauthorized border crossings significantly (Miller and Orchard, 2014). 
Other than waiting for winter to come and discourage the refugees to travel over the 
Mediterranean, the EU developed another effort for responding to the human trafficking by 
initiating ‘the Mare Nostrum Operation’ with the purpose of search and rescue Syrians 
travelling over the Mediterranean. However, this plan was previously called ‘the Operation 
Triton’ and was used as a way to control the EU borders and apply geographical restrictions 
instead of developing a humanitarian response (Coen, 2015).  
However, when it comes to the state actors, the picture gets complicated for IGOs and 
realization of their goals. Also the EU policies of safe third country and temporary 
protection status are open to the abuses of states with the purpose of evading the 
responsibility to protect and overcoming the convention definition of refugee status 
together with the R2P. For the safe third country concept, the trend for the state behavior is 
to determine any country appropriate as a safe country and apply return procedures to that 
country; since there is no legal enforcement on determination of the safe country. The only 
way for preventing this kind of return relies on the asylum seeker who is expected to prove 
his/her fear of prosecution on that specific safe country, assuming he/she is listened 
properly. For the temporary protection, the main concern is that the definitional scope of 
this status is left to the state to make it compatible with the traditional refugee protection; 
leaving the judgement to the national state and its moral compass, if exists (Rodger, 2001).  
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The EU-Turkey deal, is another topic on the Europe’s agenda as a relatively secure method 
for dealing with the crisis. The official explanation states the purpose of the plan as to 
prevent human trafficking and reduce the number of illegal entries to the Union from 
Greece. However, the deal is essential for the unity of Europe considering the tendency of 
Member States to free ride and close the doors for refugees. Authorities of the organization 
repeat their calling for a “concerted action” but the individual state responses are not in the 
same tone: 
It is important to restore, in a concerted manner, the normal functioning of the 
Schengen area, with full support for Member States which face difficult 
circumstances. We need to get back to a situation where all Members of the 
Schengen area apply fully the Schengen Borders Code and refuse entry at external 
borders to third-country nationals, … while taking into account the specificities of 
maritime borders, including by implementing the EU-Turkey agenda (EC, 201653).  
However, the prevailing opinion is that the EU-Turkey deal did not result in the promised 
peaceful resolutions; opponents claim that the deal exacerbated the situation for the 
refugees in hotspots. Established by the organization as a part of response to the influx, 
hotspots, or officially ‘Reception and Identification Centers’ are designed for registering 
the refugees and processing the asylum requests. However, according to Human Rights 
Watch, with the implementation of the deal, these centers are turned into detention centers 
in which ‘restriction of movement’ is applied to the refugees. Moreover, the conditions of 
the centers and the treatment of the asylum seekers are described as ‘unsafe and unsanitary’ 
by the reporters of the HRW. The monitoring capacities of the EU on the overwhelmed 
Greece is so insufficient that police violence is observed on the refugees waiting for 
protection (HRW, 201654). 
As a solution to the overwhelmed border countries’ experience, the EU decided on 
promoting relocation systems and agreed on a small number of refugees to relocated, up to 
160,000. However, the UN considers that the problem is so deeply rooted that it cannot be 
solved only through relocations. As the UNHCR spokesperson posits, it requires a larger-
scoped solution to involve the whole Europe into the solution and develop a collective 
response. However, the conundrum is visible for everyone; as the UN High Commissioner 
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for Refugees states in his words "This is a crisis of political will combined with lack of 
European unity that is resulting in management mayhem” (UNCHR, 201555). 
In fact, among the EU regulations, there exists a directive that precisely targets the current 
Syrian refugee crisis; the usually unnamed Temporary Protection Directive (TPD). 
Designed for the massive influx cases in particular, the fundamental benefit of the directive 
is that it does not require individual assessment of the asylum claim since it is based on a 
group decision. This means that, when adopted, the TPD may give the promise of releasing 
the external border countries from the bureaucratic and financial burden of processing all 
asylum applications individually. Although it seems to be a more effective solution than the 
reforms on Dublin regulation, the TDP remains as a non-issue for both Member States and 
the Council (Hoel, 2015).  
The reasoning is a realist one; the execution of the Directive requires qualified majority 
voting and neither Member States nor the Council is willing to make an offer for it to be 
voted. None of the responsible actors wants to take action to change the status quo and 
initiate the mechanism of fair burden sharing among Member States. Very similar to the 
UN Security Council dilemma, the infeasibility of political situation makes most actors a 
bystander to the crisis and prevents the obvious solution to be operationalized (Akkaya, 
2015). 
Scholars and experts argue that the Syrian migrant crisis is an illustration of the 
susceptibility of the EU structure to coercive bargaining tactics of nation states unilaterally. 
Greenhill posits that the consequence of this structural vulnerability is making a gradual 
disbanding among the union a probable future. Describing the state behavior as 
schizophrenic and hypocritical, he considers the unilateral responses of states to the crisis 
as critical for the consolidation of the union (2016). Following this light of inquiry, an 
analysis of the Brexit decision and unity of the organization from the perspective of 
managing the refugee crisis would produce interesting results. 
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The United Nations 
The UN has contributed to the crisis mostly with its humanitarian relief agencies and its 
capacity to operate in various countries that are affected from the crisis. Also it contributed 
to the process of officially detecting the usage of chemical weapons and destruction of 
them. However, the central failure of the UN for intervening the Syrian conflict has been 
primarily caused by the politics in the Security Council. The reiterated vetoes from the 
permanent members Russia and China against any action to intervene Syria was the biggest 
obstacle to the UN. One of the four vetoes of the two country was in 2014; against the 
common statement of 58 UN countries calling the Security Council to refer the Syrian 
situation to the International Criminal Court (Human Rights Watch, 2015 56 ). The 
fundamental threat of this predicament is that each veto further bastardizes the 
humanitarian situation in Syria and refugees outside by revitalizing the parties to war and 
forcing masses to move out. 
UN, the only institution which has both legitimacy and authority for implementation of the 
R2P according to Evans, (2008), was not effective in responding to the crisis on time. 
Described as “the only credible international institution” could not achieve the goal of 
involving state actors in and enforce the R2P principle as the ground for international 
protection (Coen, 2015). The political configuration of the organization mostly prevented it 
from actively engaging in the resolution of conflict as well as the refugee crisis.  
The UN has been harshly criticized for its inaction during the crisis; in March 2012, 49 
countries worldwide started bilateral sanctions against the Syrian government together with 
the EU, the Arab League. Particularly for the initial phases of the conflict, the passive 
attitude of the UN Security Council is pointed out to be highly responsible for the creation 
of power vacuum in Syria and the corollary escalation of conflict. The consecutive failures 
of the peace missions appointed by the Secretary General, cancellation of all attempts for 
military intervention by the double vetoes of China and Russia at the Security Council and 
the Russian obduracy to prevent any intervention to Syria provided the Assad regime with a 
suitable environment to continue violence against civilians. One additional actor which 
further complicates the puzzle was Iran; it has been supporting the regime in Syria 
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politically, financially and militarily. The war in Syria is regarded as an existential threat to 
Iran’s existence; hence a peace solution has to involve Tehran as well. The triangle that 
Russia, China and Iran draws blocks any kind of intervention to the conflict in Syria. It was 
this deadlock of political interests that has been preventing also the Geneva peace talks to 
brings parties to the table and reach at a ceasefire, at least (Adams, 2015).  
On the other hand, with respect to the refugee crisis, the UNHCR initiates and supports the 
efforts to increase burden sharing mechanisms. For this purpose, it has created the Central 
Mediterranean Sea Initiative in order to contribute to the rescue operations in the sea 
(Miller and Orchard, 2014). It leads the missions such as Regional Refugee Resilience Plan 
and pursue a strategic framework for realizing the humanitarian relief targets.  
However, the organization is not successful enough to convince state actors to apply the 
international norms and rules to the current crisis. Some countries in the EU do not 
recognize the UNHCR decision that most Syrians qualifying for international protection 
have the right to be granted refugee status. They decline the application and grant other 
types of protection. Hungary, for instance, does not respond to the warnings of the UNHCR 
on not to return refugees to Serbia because of lack of capacity to handle the large 
magnitude of inflow. However, the Hungarian authorities, discarded the non-refoulement 
principle by distorting the safe third country understanding of the EU system. Also the 
mere reaction of the UN to the police violence against refugees protesting for asylum was 
from Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, stating that he was “shocked” and found it “not 
acceptable” considering human rights and dignity (UNHCR, 201557).  
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Regional IGOs 
 
 
 “Alarmed by the urgency of the matter,  
I appeal to the international community in its entirety to let no other calculations,  
but “humanitarianism” and “human dignity”,  
guide their thinking while responding to the Syrian refugee crisis.  
I wish to remind all nations of their 
moral and legal obligations under  
the international law to help those desperate refugees.” 
OIC Secretary General58 
Iyad Ameen Madani  
 
Other than the worldwide organizations, the regional IGOs also contributed to the effort to 
end the conflict in Syria and resolve the humanitarian crisis. To begin with, the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation was a supporter of peace in Syria and condemned the 
government because of its illegitimate actions. However, the response remained passive in 
general since they opposed a military solution and supported state sovereignty (Coen, 
2015). 
The common sense follows that the OIC, as a regional IGO, is not expected to face the 
cultural incompatibility problem with the Arab states and hence hoped to be more effective 
on the prosperous Arab states which has been inactive for accepting refugees. However, the 
Syrian conflict demonstrated that the extend of OIC’s authority seems to be restricted in 
that the organization can only take action in raising awareness on the humanitarian disaster 
and emphasize morality and dignity; nothing specific to urge individual states to participate 
burden sharing. Similarly, the OIC cannot actively lead the response despite it has the 
knowledge of region; uttermost, the Secretary General Madani calls for burden sharing and 
emphasizes cooperation between the EU and UN (OIC, 2015). 
The Arab League, on the other hand, had put determined efforts to condemn the Assad 
regime since the outbreak of the conflict. Suspension of Syrian membership to the 
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organization, contribution to the UN resolution initiative during the Kofi Annan’s 
mediation, proposing a plan for resolution, support at the Security Council are among other 
paths followed by the Arab League. In addition to political sanctioning, strict bans were put 
on Syrian transactions together with other financial sanctions to the government operations. 
(Mencutek, 2014). 
However, similar to the worldwide IGOs, the regional structures suffer from power 
balances among state actors which possibly paralyze the decision making mechanisms. The 
vetoes coming from the superpowers Russia and China, was also influencing the Arab 
League, for instance. Russia blamed the organization for acting provocative. On the other 
hand, the regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar were blocking the operational 
scope of the organization with the disproportionate authority they have. Benefiting from the 
chaotic atmosphere, Assad accused the organization of acting hostile towards the Syrian 
state itself and even supporting the opposition by buying time to regain power. 
Equally fundamental as the power configuration in the region, IGOs lose reputation and 
authority for future operations with the lack of effectiveness in resolving the complications 
of power dynamics. History of bad governance during the previous conflicts affect the 
success of future interventions. The regional IGOs as well suffered from lack of legitimacy 
which was resulted by the failures in previous conflicts and crisis to intervene, actively 
advocate human rights and boast cooperation. As in the Syrian case, this ineffective past 
reduced the enforcement capacity and weakened the voice of regional IGOs, making them 
vulnerable for state abuses of their statements and strategies (Coen, 2015). 
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2.2.2. Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
“The global humanitarian community is not broken  
– as a whole they are more effective than ever before. 
 But we are financially broke.” 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees  
António Guterres 
 
Organizations such as ICRC, UNHCR, IOM or the Syrian Arab Red Crescent are the 
international NGOs actively participate in the formulation of the humanitarian response to 
the Syrian conflict and the massive influx following it. The Human Rights Watch and 
similar organizations are trying to raise awareness on human suffering and the insufficiency 
of the measures taken by the international community. NGOs and IGOs, in general, are 
expected to fill the gap between refugees and the host states; to increase communication 
and contribute to the daily lives of people (Fargues, 2014). For the Syrian refugee 
emergency, the UNHCR takes the lead of the operations assuming the role of cooperation 
between government, other organizations and providing funding from international donors. 
Also they work with local organizations to collect information, familiarize with the culture 
and region and increase the operational scope (Coen, 2015).  
However, although the mission of UNHCR is states as “to lead and coordinate international 
action for the worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee problems”, the 
coordinator role of the UNHCR is found problematic with the skepticism that it may create 
some obstacles to the humanitarian operation. Crisp et al. (2013), conducting a 
comprehensive analysis of the organization’s mandate of the Syrian operation, find four 
turbulent points of UNHCR leadership. First of all, the possibility of conflict of interests 
increases doubts on the coordinator role of UNHCR since it assumes also control of 
operations and more critically, funding. These responsibilities may coincide and create 
gridlocks that delay delivery of the aid. Second, the gigantic operational scope of the 
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organization preoccupying it with other missions may hinder the coordinator position. 
Third, the chronical problem, is the tendency of the UNHCR to focus on its own agencies 
and implementing partners rather than approaching all organizations equally. Finally, the 
danger of vocational blindness that may cause the UNHCR to act oblivious to the know-
how and planning of the other organizations. These points, together with the general 
tendency to question the capacity of the organization based on the past performance, 
increase the suspicions against the coordinator role of the UNHCR.  
The Syrian emergency is a clear example of hindrance from politics to the humanitarian 
relief operations. The major obstacle to the response from the has been the Syrian 
government; otherwise these organizations have put tremendous effort with their voluntary 
participants to provide humanitarian aid. However, as the chronical problem of these 
organizations, the political deadlock to the resolution of crisis increased the insecurity in 
the region and impeded the NGO activity making access to some areas of the country 
almost impossible. More critical than the regime, presence of the IS constituted a serious 
threat to the NGO activity; as the Westerners, they were also targets of the IS militants with 
the purposes of attracting international attention, terrorizing people and capturing the NGO 
resources (Coen, 2015). 
Following the security problem as an existential threat to the NGO presence in the region, 
second biggest concern of the humanitarian aid operations is financial. Today, 
organizations active in the region suffer from the lack of funding for the biggest 
humanitarian refugee crises of the world history. The reluctance of states and international 
community to find political solutions to the crises adds up to the financial troubles and 
result in a humanitarian disaster. Most Syrian refugees are not able to meet their basic 
needs for survival (UNHCR, 2016). The donor country contributions adding up to private 
initiatives are still perilously insufficient for meeting the needs of displaced population 
(Ostrand, 2015). The UNHCR is short of 70% of the necessary funding for the Syrian 
Regional Response Plan for humanitarian relief (UNHCR, 2016). As a result of the 
financial troubles faced, some NGOs are obliged to apply temporary suspension to their 
operations, risking lives of numerous people. To illustrate, the UN World Food Program 
   
64 
 
had to pause its assistance for 1.7 million refugees about two weeks which left hundreds of 
Syrians in desperate conditions (Ostrand, 2015).  
Despite all the efforts, NGOs are not capable to develop solutions for the whole refugee 
population. The realities of the nation-state system make the organizations realize that 
resettling all of the Syrians seeking asylum is not applicable. Hence, for instance, the 
Amnesty International has determined a threshold of at least 10% of Syrians, the most 
vulnerable ones, need to be resettled or offered some kind of admission by the end of 2016 
(Amnesty International, 201559).  
Additionally, NGO idealism are hindered by the state logic at the operational level as well. 
UNHCR authorities feel the need for investing more in monitoring activities, publishing 
guidelines for processes such as detention, judicial review or transfer of vulnerable persons. 
They aim at increasing monitoring activities along the borders of countries building fences 
as Hungary since state actors are deaf to the warnings of the UNHCR that the presumption 
of innocence for refugees dictates that all evaluations on an asylum claim should begin with 
the assumption that refugees, themselves, are the victims of violence and forms of 
terrorism; the international protection regime is not for aiding and abetting terrorists or 
preventing criminal prosecution. However, since most states tend to perceive refugees as 
threats and close their borders, NGOs have to find other ways to monitor and deter them. 
Basically, the agencies have to find the possible ways used by states to apply refoulement 
in the name of refugees against in order to counteract it more effectively (UNHCR, 2016) 
Another version of containment by state actors to the NGO operations was experienced as a 
result of the EU-Turkey deal. As mentioned earlier, the deal has led to considerable 
disappointment and human suffering in the reception centers on top of the forced return. It 
reached to the point that protests have begun among the Syrians refugees trying to survive 
in terrible conditions in the hotspots. The MSF Greece reported to withdraw its operations 
as a result of the inhumane treatment, police brutality and criminalization of asylum in the 
islands; the Head of MSF mission in Greece explained their distress: 
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We made the extremely difficult decision to end our activities in Moria [a Greek 
hotspot] because continuing to work inside would make us complicit in a system we 
consider to be both unfair and inhumane, we will not allow our assistance to be 
instrumentalized for a mass expulsion operation, and we refuse to be part of a 
system that has no regard for the humanitarian or protection needs of asylum 
seekers and migrants (MSF, 201660). 
Another case of state restriction on NGO operations is the Turkish government’s 
containment against the UNHCR. Turkey formulated a perspicacious legal stance towards 
the refugee status such that the regime adopted does not allow for a thorough international 
monitoring over the processes such as camp management, refugee registration and 
documentation. The government mostly manages the massive refugee population 
unilaterally and does not involve the UNHCR into the operations on the beneficiaries of 
temporary protection (Durukan et al., 201561). 
The Syrian crisis has become a benchmark for understanding the operations of non-
traditional NGOs and their contribution. These establishments, such as the Islamic 
organizations funded appreciably by the Gulf states, operate outside of the conventional 
framework for the humanitarian relief organizations. Although the quality of their work is 
not easily evaluated based on the standards and consistency; their contribution is still 
valuable to the Syrian refugees in need of help. International NGOs should establish closer 
communications with these non-traditional organizations to promote coordination for 
humanitarian assistance (Crisp et al., 2013). To illustrate, a local organization called the 
Syria Bright Future was established by two Syrians and carried its medical help operations 
to international level and provided help to Syrian refugees in various fields (Abo-Hilal and 
Yousef, 2014). These non-traditional ways of provision of humanitarian assistance grow in 
time and reach substantial successes, if not undermined by state parties and conflict of 
interests.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RWANDAN CASE 
 
“It is better to be wrong by killing no one  
rather than be right with mass graves.” 
A. Camus. 
 
 
A Brief History of Genocide and the Afterwards 
The Rwandan exodus was described as the highest in magnitude and abruptness in Africa’s 
history; about 3.5 million of Rwandans were displaced with the population of around 7 
million at the time. Among the displaced, about 2.2 million became refugees fleeing mostly 
countries in the region. (Hovil, 2010). The historical and socio-political background of the 
events preparing the ground for the large scaled exodus is described in this part.  
Rwanda is a central African country neighboring Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (called Zaire before 1997). After the colonization period in 
the nineteenth century, it became a German East African colony until the WWI. 
Afterwards, the Belgian mandate had taken control of it. In 1962, the Rwandan people 
obtained independence and today’s Rwanda was established (Prunier, 1997). 
The Rwandan society was constituted by two main ethnicities: Hutus and Tutsis. The 
European colonizers inspired by the social Darwinism, particularly the Belgians, 
established an ethnic hierarchy among the two interwoven groups sharing a common 
culture, language and religion for centuries. The physical differences between the two 
groups were institutionalized to the extent that the identity documents had ethnicity section. 
The Belgians were favoring the Tutus, since they looked more Europeans, and the Tutsi 
minority were given superior positions in politics which ended up with increased 
polarization among the society (ICAR, 2004).  
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The Tutu domination was overthrown with a Hutu social revolution together with the end 
of colonization in late 1950s. The Republic of Rwanda was established through this 
revolution and massacre of hundreds of Tutsis in addition to the ones who achieve to 
survive and flee the country. Around 120,000 Tutsis became refugees in neighboring 
countries Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Zaire. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was 
formed in this three decades in exile by refugees in Uganda and their children belonging to 
the Tutsi ethnicity. In fact, what triggered the escalation of the civil violence in Rwanda 
was the repercussions of ignored refugees suffering for years (Van der Meeren, 1996).  
In 1980s, the Rwandan state was experiencing economic fluctuations as a result of the 
major decline in coffee prices which was the main export of the country. During the 
economic crisis, civil war broke out when the RPF forces in Uganda invaded Rwanda to 
overthrow the Hutu government in 1990. With the invasion, the Hutu extremism initiated 
its violence campaign against Tutsis (Eriksson et al., 1999). The war continued for four 
years; the President Habyarimana resisted first, but the escalation of conflict forced him to 
agree on a power-sharing with Tutsis. A ceasefire agreement called Arusha Accords was 
reached and negotiations began with the intervention and facilitation of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) and the Tanzanian government, in August 1993. However, the 
ostensible end of the war did not terminate the resentment of the parties, and neither of 
them was content with the agreement. The President was labeled as betrayer by the Hutu 
extremists (Hovil, 2010).  
The historic moment as a spark of the genocide was the shooting of the plane carrying 
Habyarimana and the Burundian President in April 1994. The suspects of the incident have 
never been identified; it could be either Tutsis who wanted to escalate or extremists Hutus 
taking the revenge from the President for giving away power in Arusha. Either way, the 
massacre described as “systematic killing” of Tutsis and moderate Hutus had begun. 
Although it is almost impossible to pinpoint the exact number, the official figure of the 
victims of the genocide took place within 100 days is 800,000 to 850,000 Tutsis and 10,000 
to 30,000 Hutus as the fiasco of the international community’s inaction (Prunier, 1997). 
The international community were almost blind and deaf to all the news and reports 
flowing through the media, agencies and experts. No sufficient response to the crises of 
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refugees and IDPs were formulated. According to the official records and reports, the act 
was a genocide and the incumbent government and authorities were involved in this 
systematic killing operation. The tension between the RPF forces and government was 
escalating but it still remained unnoticed by the world. Even during the Arusha 
negotiations, the regime was leading an organized, determined and detrimentally aggressive 
massacre of the Tutsis. Blacklists of all Tutsis and moderate Hutus were created and death 
squads were being operationalized and commanded to dispose of all “internal enemies” or 
“Tutsi cockroaches”. Also a constant radio broadcast of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille 
Collines (RTML) was provoking violence through its hate propaganda on Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus (Des Forges, 1999; Eriksson et al., 1999).  
As explained earlier, the events that prepared the ground for the genocide were initiated 
with the militarized conflict between the Hutu government of Rwanda and the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) of Tutsis. 1992. According to the Arusha Accords, a neutral military 
observer group was planned to send to the region to protect peace. However, as the 
ceasefire was breached in 1993 the hostilities resumed on, leading to the establishment of 
an international force to maintain the Arusha decisions and protect peace. Deployed by the 
UN Security Council, this international army, the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) was designed to ensure and monitor that the parties abide by the 
decisions of the Agreement (UNAMIR Mission Statement, 1993).  
The initial purpose of the authorities was to minimize the operational cost of Rwandan 
peace keeping forces. With this objective in mind, the military expert recommendation was 
8,000 soldiers as the lowest threshold. After the US intervention and restructuring, the 
UNAMIR forces was established with 2,548 soldiers (Des Forges, 1999). Furthermore, the 
deployment of the actual physical forces to the field was delayed 2 months after the 
decision of the Security Council and sent in December 1994, due to the inflexible 
bureaucracy in the Council. Not surprisingly for such UN operations, the troops were 
ordered to use arms only for self-defense (Eriksson et al., 1999).   
Responding to the genocide of Tutsis, RPF attacked the capitol, Kigali, and seized power. 
As a result, more than 2.3 million Hutus fled to neighboring countries; one million people 
on the other hand, became internally displaced people (IDPs) in the country (Prunier, 
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1997). Among the refugees, the perpetrators of the genocide were hiding in refugee camps 
at borders. At this point, ignorance of the responsible state authorities to screen and 
differentiate the genuine refugees from the génocidaires created the lethal consequences 
afterwards. The “Rwanda outside Rwanda” (Prunier, 2011) was the trigger of multiple 
other waves of refugees of which repercussions are still felt today.  
The situation among the survivors were not any better. Although some reports regard the 
immediate humanitarian intervention as commendable (Eriksson et al., 1999), the figures 
tell the opposite: the death rate among refugees were between 6-10 % because of the 
epidemics such as cholera, dysentery or Shigella and bad medical practice to these diseases. 
More than 100,000 people died in total and the humanitarian aid did now arrive until the 
second week of the epidemic (UNHCR, 2000).  
As of now twenty-two years after the genocide, the current Tutsi-dominated government 
follows an institutionalized approach of continuing exclusion and threatening of Hutus. The 
President Paul Kagame is the person who led the RPF forces during the genocide and took 
power from the Hutu government. Now, the state monopoly construction is required and 
the best way to achieve it is to use the legacy of genocide and its perpetrators as a tool to 
consolidate state authority, in a country experiencing the post-genocide trauma (Hovil, 
2010). However, with the Cessation Clause in 2013, at a time there existed 100,000 
Rwandan refugees outside, the UNHCR announced that the ‘voluntary’ repatriations will 
continue until all Rwandese people are back until the end of 2016. Needless to emphasize, 
most refugees of matter now are Hutus who still have reasonable fear of prosecution in 
Rwanda; but they have to go home not to be stateless persons (Nyange, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
70 
 
 
Figure 2. Refugee Movements in the Great Lake Region  
 
Source: Vassall-Adams, 1994, p.40. 
 
  
 
 
Table 2. Refugees in the Region 
Country 
Refugees in the 
Region- 
Since April 1994 
Zaire 1,464,000 
Tanzania 473,000 
Uganda 10,000 
Burundi 255,000 
TOTAL 2,202,000 
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3.1. Determinants of State-Level Responses to the Refugee Crisis 
 
 
“By early 1995,  
all the warring parties had shown 
 a willingness to abandon respect for the International Humanitarian Law 
if required to make a choice between humanitarian values and political priorities.” 
James Fennel62 
 
During the mid 1990s, the period in which the Rwandan genocide and following refugee 
crises were witnessed, the security perception of states and the nature of refugee protection 
has begun to change. Many states added qualifications to the refugee protection policies in 
terms of scope and magnitude (Eriksson et al., 1996; Whitaker, 2002). Only in 1996, more 
than 20 states decided to deport the asylum seekers within their borders for national 
security reasons (US Committee for Refugees, 1997). With this paradigm shift from the 
monistic humanitarianism to instrumental humanitarianism (Weiner, 1998), states 
prioritized security and political concern with respect to refugee protection and always 
opted for repatriation, voluntary or not. As the UNHCR Commissioner Ogata Sadako 
described the situation, what states prefer is “the least worst option in a no-win situation” 
considering their own interests (Ogata, 1997). 
Specific for the Rwandan case; states were mostly under the pressure of domestic politics 
and impacts of previous conflicts or the current ones at the time. Negative experiences 
together with lack of interest resulted in apathy of the third parties. That is why, no matter 
how highly emphasized it is in the academic literature; conflict prevention was almost 
impossible for this case, as Eriksson et al. explain: 
No state involved in the conflict happened at the time to have the optimal 
combination of interest, capacity and neutrality that could have generated 
appropriate early warnings and translated them into conflict-mitigation strategies 
(1996, p.22).  
Also failing to screen the refugees fleeing into their borders was a major omission from the 
perspective of states and their responsibilities for preventing the crisis from growing 
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further. This was an essential problem since some of the refugees had engaged in genocide 
and with the lack of monitoring and policing, they obtained the chance to hide in the 
refugee camps, inevitably leading to further conflicts and violence (Hovil, 2010).  
Another vital failure of states was the short-termed mindset of the responses. The involved 
Western states complied with only funding humanitarian assistance; no political response 
was formulated, merely substitutions of it was applied and failed. Inevitably, the 
indifference of the state actors circumscribed the range of action for the international 
community and organizations. Without an effective political standing, international 
organizations were able to achieve less even with all the effort they put (Eriksson et al., 
1996).  
State behaviors of deporting the refugees had repercussions on other actors. After Zaire and 
Tanzania announced expelling all Rwandans, about ten NGOs operating in the region 
decided to withdraw their operations, such as Care-Canada MSF-France. Also the state 
authorities did not take the necessary precautions to provide the security of the aid workers 
who were sometimes the target of death threats (MSF, 199563).   
Supporting the argument in the literature that the type of refugee influences the state 
responses to grant asylum or not; the Rwandan refugees and their history of engaging in 
civil conflicts and rebellions in host countries had an impact on state responses. Van Der 
Meeren (1996) states that the refugees in Zaire and Uganda in 1960s shaped a negative 
perception in the minds of state actors which triggers national security mechanisms to 
preclude fulfillment of the responsibility of states to protect.  
In this section, the determinants of the responses to the Rwandan refugee crisis by the 
involved states are analyzed in detail. The hotspots of refugee flows during the genocide 
and the period afterwards were Goma, Bukavu and Uvira in Zaire; Ngara and Karagwe in 
Tanzania and Kabale in Uganda. The highest flows were to Tanzania and Zaire in the 
region. Other than the regional states, two other states were involved in the response: 
Belgium and France. The relative positions of these four states and their concerns are 
discussed to describe the various motivations behind responses.  
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3.1.1. Belgium 
Belgium, as the old colonizer of the country, had deep political connections with Ruwanda 
and was a firm supporter of the Tutsi minority until 1950s. It was the Belgians who likened 
Tutsis to the Europeans and granted them most administrative positions and the rule of the 
country, basically. However, with the colonial system ending, new political structures 
required the majority Hutus to involve in the rule. Instead of leaving the governing to the 
minority, the Belgians simply preferred the ethnic majority as a democratic majority and 
supported the 1962 Hutu social revolution both militarily and politically (Des Forges, 
1999).   
For the formulation of a response to the genocide, Belgium was regarded as the most 
concerned one among the Western powers. Although this concern was demonstrated only 
by calling the Rwandan ambassador to have more information on the incoming genocide 
reports, Belgium made another contribution by sending forces to the UNAMIR. 
Constituting one half of the force, Belgian forces constituted the main body of the operation 
(UNAMIR Mission Statement, 1993). Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)-Doctors without 
Borders regards the UNAMIR operation as ineffective and sometimes pointless, since the 
soldiers were not able to use their capacities to prevent genocide from happening. 
Moreover, Belgium failed further with their decision for total withdrawal from Rwanda 
(Human Rights Watch, 1999). In April 1994 when the killings hit the peak, the UNAMIR 
forces were decreased from 1,700 to 270 troops after the Belgian soldiers were killed 
(MSF, 199564).  
The reasoning of the Belgian government was that the mission of the UNAMIR forces was 
over with the eruption of the war since its objective was to protect peace. Simply put, there 
is no need for a peacekeeping army if there is no peace at all. Also the probability of any 
other losses made the Belgians decide to terminate their contribution to the UNAMIR 
mission and call their soldiers back home (Des Forges, 1999).  
Regardless of the official rationale, the reality was, in the words of the Boutros-Ghali, UN 
Secretary, “Belgium was afflicted with ‘the Somalia Syndrome’: pull out at the first 
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encounter with serious trouble” (Boutros-Ghali, 2000). However, the Belgians are still 
regarded as the most determined actor, compared with other international actors (Des 
forges, 1999), in spite of their early withdrawal from the mission they initially led.  
3.1.2. France 
French regarded Rwanda as its backyard, a useful tool in the region to continue its political 
and economic interests. For the continuation of the old colonial rivalry, Rwanda was an 
interesting country since it was a former Belgian colony. Its support is won from Belgium; 
hence valuable. It was kind of a proxy war over the Francophone Hutus and Anglo-Saxon 
supported English speaking RPF. Speaking a fluent French, being a devout Catholic, and 
assimilated into the French culture very well, President Habyarimana was a proper 
candidate for an ally to France. This blessing of an international power and a permanent 
Security Council member was the fundamental anchorage of the Rwandan government for 
its boldness in pursuing aggressive policies against the RPF. (Des Forges, 1999). Also the 
Zairian states, the alternative option as a satellite country, was on the verge of collapse and 
failure; leaving Rwanda as the best ally for France. 
The Operation Turquoise 
France supported Rwandan government with its fight against the RPF, as a tool for 
maintaining its prestige and reputation in the eyes of international community. If a French 
supported government were to lose, other French ally countries could be influenced from 
the situation in Rwanda and judge the French authority and usefulness of its alliance. The 
historian Prunier (1995) explains the reasoning of the French government to support the 
Rwandan incumbent as for the sake of its geopolitical cost-benefit analysis; the power 
demonstration to the world that France is still able to project on the Africa. To prove that it 
still can successfully protect its client state, France initiated the Operation Turquoise under 
the Resolution 929 (June 1994) of the Security Council and decided to send its troops. The 
official mission of the operation was “to contribute to the security and protection of 
displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk” and the force had the authority to “use all 
necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives” (Dowty and Loescher, 1996, 
p.64). 
   
75 
 
Although the official mission of the Operation Turquoise was “to save human lives”, an 
implicit purpose of the operation was to preserve territory and legitimacy of the interim 
government. The way to achieve this purpose was going through prevention of an RPF 
victory, since the experts in Paris were thinking that RPF’s victory would be a total 
“catastrophe” for France (Des Forges, 1999).  
Another claim based on observations is that France were more inclined to military solutions 
than peace (MSF, 199565). Increasing the limited military training provided by French 
soldiers was extended to the whole army, after the Arusha negotiations. Also the French 
ambassador Martres officially declared their alliance by stating “France will act in accord 
with the Rwandan authorities” (Des Forges, 1999). According to Wheeler, what reveals the 
implicit motivation is the French support for the reducing of the UNAMIR forces which 
will directly mean leaving the ground to the Rwandan government to continue the 
massacre. Also the inaction of the French forces to the relentless killings implies that the 
operation was far from being a humanitarian one (2000). France even supported the 
Rwandan government militarily according to Des Forges (Also Wheeler, 2000), by sending 
500 troops to Rwandan government in 1993. He claims that there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that French troops were “close to combat” (1999).  
French soldiers were slow to act to save Tutsis since they were accepting Tutsis as RPF 
infiltrators. Moreover, Des Forges finds supporting information for his claim that even the 
French soldiers were thinking that they were sent in order to stop the RPF advancement. 
Hence they shut their eyes to the operations of genocide officials despite their mission of 
bringing peace and stop human suffering. In the eyes of the French government, the 
genocide reports were “just rumors” and the Rwandan government was “respectful of 
humans rights” (Des Forges, 1999). However, what they did actually to intervene 
humanitarianly was only an operation for rescuing the French and Western population, key 
people of the Habyarimana’s team and the embassy dog. They also helped the génocidaires 
after the RPF took power by letting them flee Rwanda and accepting them as refugees (Des 
Forgers, 1999).  
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The selective nature of the Operation also makes observers sceptic about the motivations of 
the French government. Through the two months of the mission, the Safe Zone created by 
the Operation concentrated forces in the south-west of Rwanda. Although this move 
protected a number of people from massacres, it led to a commendable amount of people to 
flee to the north-west as a result of the RPF advancement there. By concentrating their 
forces around the Safe Zone, the French invoked a massive influx to Goma, Zaire. 
Additionally, they neglected the protection of the humanitarian operations in the north-west 
and left an increasing number of displaced people in need of help (Eriksson et al., 1999; 
MSF, 199566).  
Also the discussion in the literature on the creation of safe zone by France is a clear 
indicator of state actors using refugees and humanitarian aid for realization of their own 
interests. According to Wheeler (2000), the fact that the zone was set up on the day RPF 
took Kigali over, the capital of Rwanda, was not a coincidence. That is how the 
génocidaires who were running from RPF could get a place to hide and gather strength. 
The French officials did not screen or arrest criminals; did not intervene with the radio 
broadcast airing hate and violence; did not police the streets in which Tutsis were being 
massacred. Why did France, with the mission of saving lives, not do these clearly reveals 
the realpolitik behind the French operation. The official claim was to protect the refugee 
population; however, the reality on the ground was that the RPF was not allowed to enter 
the zone (ibid).  
The fundamental problem of the French attitude is that France was indeed the most capable 
state and actor who could react rapidly and effectively to stop what is happening in 
Rwanda. With the knowledge of the army structure, the government and its capabilities and 
the power to send clear signals to the leader of génocidaires, France could have made a 
difference in the picture. Even closing down the radio station RTML which was 
broadcasting the hate propaganda to the public would be vitally important (Wheeler, 2000).  
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3.1.3. Zaire  
The total number of refugees that Zaire received aftermath of the genocide was 1,375,000 
(ICAR, 2004 67 ). As much as the exorbitant numbers, the abruptness of the influx 
demonstrates the situation in Zaire. In July 1994, 850,000 refugees fled to Goma within 5 
days. The extraordinary amount overwhelmed most of the relief agencies in the field.  
Furthermore, Zaire at the time was a state at the verge of failure and that made an indirect 
influence on its response. For a country experiencing civil war, consequences of the influx 
of a refugee population engaging in insurgency was detrimental (Human Rights Watch, 
2014). In some cases, the level of humanitarian aid to refugees was higher than the situation 
of the local population and that caused resentment among the Zairians (Eriksson et al., 
1999).  
An appalling case of the claim that refugees increases security risks and triggers conflict 
was the Zairian situation in which some of the militia were regrouping in the host country 
thanks to the lack of monitoring and policing. The costliest consequence of this ignorant 
behavior of host governments was to the Zairian President, Mobutu Sese Soko. In the mid 
1996, the Hutu militia, the ostensible refugees, who were upset with the power change in 
Rwanda started to recuperate around a territorial niche in Zaire with the support of the local 
Hutu population (UNHCR, 200068 ). After the attacks of these presumed génocidaires 
hiding in camps to Rwandan, a revenge campaign was started by the Tutsi government in 
Rwanda against the camps, in November 1996. Rwandan forces were attacking border 
camps of the neighboring countries. With the support of Uganda, RPF forces invaded Zaire 
and destroyed refugee camps pushing refugees out. In addition, with the support of Tutsi-
originated rebellious group Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-
Zaire (ADFL) which The Rwandan government was seeing as its natural ally, they 
overthrew the President Mobutu who was supported by Hutu extremists. These 
developments in the region led to the deportation of almost all refugees by the Tanzanian 
government within a few days and approximately 600,000 refugees were deported to 
Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Rodger, 2001). 
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Other than the numerous registered refugees, we are not fully informed about the people 
who are not able to be traced somehow, the UNHCR estimates this number as 250,000; as 
the unknown part of refugees who are assumed to be dead (UNHCR, 200069). According to 
the Human Rights Watch Report, another 300,000 were fleeing to the Zairian forests were 
caught and killed by the Rwandan troops (Lemarched, 1998). Some of them were presumed 
dead either by the massacres or starvation (199770).  
Presenting the fine line between the realpolitik and state-making/war-making capacities of 
state structures (Tilly et al, 1985), the Zairian government played an indirect but crucial 
role in the establishment of the Rwandan government in the exiles of the Zairian state (Van 
der Meeren, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1995). The President of Zaire, Mobutu, used 
refugees in his country as a political leverage and applied the state logic of refugee 
protection in his calculations. To further discredit the Rwandan government, he accepted 
Rwandan refugees and moreover, supported the refugees militarily in addition to training 
them. Whitaker underlines that  
In Zaire, the Rwandan refugees became a political resource that was manipulated by 
many sides in the violent struggle for power. Of course, in this instance, Mobutu’s 
calculations were drastically wrong and resulted in his removal from power by a 
rebel alliance backed by a new government in Rwanda that was concerned about its 
own security (2003, p.223).  
3.1.4. Tanzania 
The Rwandan influx of 674,000 refugees was the most abrupt and extensive in its 
magnitude in Tanzanian history. As a very poor country experiencing severe scarcity of 
food and water resources causing high mortality rates, Tanzania received a large number of 
refugees with respect to capable states which remained indifferent. However, in order to 
keep refugee hosting as temporary as possible, the Tanzanian government allowed the 
camps to be established next to the border and kept them densely populated (Eriksson et al., 
1999). 
In terms of understanding the state perspective on refugee protection, Tanzania is another 
case that illustrates the way raison d’état works (Whitaker, 2003). At the time of the 
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genocide and influx, Tanzania was going through a transition towards political liberalism 
and increasing its strength of democratic institutions. That is why, it needed peace and 
stability in the region for continuing its transition. However, as described for the Zairian 
case, the RPF was regarding the refugees in the borders camps as a threat to its existence 
and trying to build a buffer zone along the borders in order to secure itself (McNulty 1999). 
In time, the war has become a war over refugees. Hence the perception was that the 
refugees in Tanzania would be the second target for the RPF forces. The Tanzanian 
government, in spite of all democratization steps, had to decide between its national 
security concerns and refugee protection (Rodger, 2001). The developments in the region 
and Zaire affected the Tanzanian government to initiate the deportation of the refugees in 
camps considering the same would happen in Tanzania (Whitaker, 2002).  
The Tanzanian government, proud of its maintenance of peace and stability in the country, 
wanted to strengthen their hand against the opposition by preventing the spillover of the 
conflict to the country. As the influx continued, the following events and repercussions of 
the refugees made the Tanzanians frustrated. Consequently, the government started to 
discourage and restrict border passing and finally deport massive amount of refugees in a 
few days. The deportation was a joint operations of the Tanzanian government and the 
UNHCR in 1996, for maintaining regional security. Despite the UNHCR involvement, the 
Tanzanian deportation and border closing were considered as a breach to the principle of 
non-refoulement and R2P. (Whitaker, 2003). 
Tanzanian government did not want to send the refugees without securing its political 
position in the eyes of international community as a successfully operating country for 
refugees and asylum seekers. That is why, the government wanted an insurance from the 
Rwandan counterpart for the refugees crossing the Tanzanian borders not to be killed. 
Additionally, they granted refugee status to some Rwandans who seek asylum, 
approximately 150 to 200 people in December 1996 (Whitaker, 2002). This number, 
understandably, can be presumed to be the genocide suspects. As the UNHCR estimates 
that 10 to 15 percent of refugees were the individuals who were suspected to engage in 
genocide and afraid of the punishment of the crime they have committed. Understandably, 
they did not want to return Rwanda and searched for refugee status (Eriksson et al., 1999). 
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As Rutinwa describes the situation, “Tanzania has skewed the logic of refugee protection. 
They only protect the killers. If you haven’t killed anyone, then you are sent home.” (1999; 
quoted from Whitaker, 2002, p.12).  
The Rwandan State and Repatriations 
The prevailing belief of the time was that the situation in Rwanda was settled and it was 
safe to return. Since it was not dangerous anymore, the refugees will not face any fear of 
persecution and they did no longer need the refugee status and protection in a third country. 
With the corollary political will to see the situation as described, the Tanzanian government 
and the UNHCR who defended repatriation acted according to this belief and announced 
the deadline of December 1996 for repatriation to Rwanda (Whitaker, 2002). This line of 
behavior supports the argument in the literature that states tend to decline refugees from 
ally states while accepting the ones from rival states (Saleyhan, 2014).  
The alacrity of Rwandan government to get the refugees back is understandable since the 
state logic needs the population intact to build its structure. With the repatriation, the 
government would win on both sides: both for eliminating or controlling the threats and for 
legitimizing its existence.  
First, as the leader of RPF forces, the President Kagame knew very well that the refugees in 
exile would be a serious threat to its government. In fact, this was a well-known fact that 
refugees have often been key players in politics, even accepted as “a motif of African 
history” (Hovil, 2010, p.13). That is why, he had to get rid of this political liability by 
getting the génocidaires back and somehow bring them to justice.   
Second, the refugee return was important for the international reputation and legitimacy for 
the government. In this sense, refugees refusing to return may sometimes be a reason for 
embarrassment for a country. To claim being a self-sufficient and competent state; Kagame 
needed the Rwandan refugees constituting almost one sixth of the population (Whitaker, 
2002). As Long explains, 
Repatriation involves the re-linking of a refugee to forms of national protection, 
symbolized through their physical return to their country of origin. (2010, p.3) 
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The only concern for the states is to the relative importance for their interest. The USA, a 
key actor for African aid politics, preferred long term construction of Rwanda rather than 
investing in refugee protection. Also as the National Security Adviser to the President 
Clinton, Anthony Lake, posits the lack of US interest in an interview: 
I think the problem here for me, for the President, for most of us at senior levels, 
was that it never became a serious issue. We were focusing on the edges of the 
problem (Ghosts of Rwanda, 2004). 
 
3.2. Determinants of International Responses to the Refugee Crisis 
 
“Agencies were faced with a stark choice:  
either provide assistance to refugees under terms set by the camp authorities  
or get out” 
James Fennel71 
 
One should not jump into the conclusion that the selfishness of the state actors is the only 
motive for the atrocity experienced in Rwanda. Although individual states behaved 
irresponsibly, the scope of their capacities and abilities should be reconsidered ––obviously 
keeping the ex-colonizer countries aside. The countries in question are mostly African 
countries experiencing civil wars themselves most of their populations are also on the 
move. Also the highest burden fell upon the most impoverished and incapable countries 
suffering from lack of resources (Dowty and Loescher, 1996). That is why, attitudes and 
actions of the actors which were capable of protection and prevention should be the focus 
of the analysis, rather than the incapable ones. In this sense, the response to the Rwandan 
refugee crisis from the international actors, under the subcategories of IGOs and NGOs, 
will be overviewed in the following sections.   
3.2.1. Intergovernmental Organizations 
As emphasized earlier, with the paradigm shift to the instrumental humanitarianism in 
1990s, states followed national interests when face with a trade off between humanitarian 
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relief. Moreover, intergovernmental organizations also tend to adopt positions which 
qualifies the amount of aid provided to the possible benefits in return. In spite of the 
emphasis on cooperation, collaboration and promotion of peace by the UN, EU and their 
agencies, the Western response to the Rwandan crisis was a unilateral one by France; since 
a small African country was of no political or economic interest to the member states of the 
EU. Also the country was not a major concern for the strategic rivalry in the international 
arena (Eriksson et al., 1999).  
The adverse impacts of the previous and current conflicts on the formulation of an effective 
response to the genocide were obvious. Unfortunately, the Mogadishu Incident in Somalia 
took place only two days before the Security Council discussion to send the UNAMIR 
forces to Rwanda. Eighteen American soldiers were killed by Somalian militia and it 
created the unsurpassable ‘Mogadishu line’ in the UN and the EU decisions (Wheeler, 
2002). Additionally, the Bosnian conflict was happening at the same time, keeping the 
organizations preoccupied with ‘more important and urgent’ problems (Wheeler, 2002; 
Eriksson et al., 1999).  
Even though it is challenging to trace the intricate chain of failures done by the 
international community, one would begin with lateness of the UN stuff to inform the 
Security Council properly about what is going on Rwanda (Des Forges 1999). Without the 
vital information which was actually on hand and ignored, the UN initiated the Arusha 
mission. Experts regard this failed mission as an example of outside intervention changing 
the ethnic power balances in a country or region; and leading to exclusion of a certain 
group. (Wheeler, 2000; Von Bernuth, 1006). Furthermore, the UN was seriously ignorant 
about the intelligence this time. Although there was clear warning from the international 
community such as the Oxfam report underlining “patterns of systematic killing” of Tutsis 
using the term “genocide” (Oxfam, 1994); the reaction was impotent. The inevitable 
consequence of this neglect was the massacre of thousands and displacement of millions.  
The lack of support from the Security Council and ignorance in general created a 
bureaucratic gap for the peacekeeping operation to be planned and realized. This gap led to 
the detrimental delay of the formation of the UNAMIR forces, therefore the peacekeeping 
was retarded, jeopardizing the negotiations (Des Forges, 1999). 
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Another detrimental negligence of the Security Council was omitting the fact that Rwanda 
was in the Council at that time, and ironically, the Rwandan ambassador was thoroughly 
informing the Rwandan Hutu government about the reluctance of the international 
community to intervene. This unconcern left the ground to the perpetrators of the genocide 
to act relentlessly (Eriksson et al., 1999).  
The responsibility of the international community to protect is not conducted in the way the 
international norms describe. Especially for the part of the UN Secretariat, the delay to 
define the genocide as “genocide” prevented the sending of military enforcement to the 
country. They preferred to describe the situation as a “tribal war” and ignored the 
information of clear evidences of ethnic cleansing. This led to inadequate strategy 
formulation and communication within the Secretariat and disjointed relationships between 
its political, military and humanitarian functions. Obviously, this ostensible delay to 
identifying genocide is directly related with the reluctance of state actors to intervene. On 
the other hand, even the UN as an IGO had to conduct its own cost-benefit calculations for 
the long rung. Loosing more soldiers in Rwanda would discredit the organization and 
threaten its future operations (Wheeler, 2002).  
The intergovernmental organizations also failed to cooperate horizontally. Scholars argue 
that a better coordination by the UN between the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and 
other regional bodies could have increase the effectiveness of both intelligence gathering, 
counteracting and intervention with its local capacities for monitoring and implementation 
(Eriksson et al., 1999). The domination of the UN agencies resulted in exclusion of 
influential regional bodies, particularly the OAU. Also its role as a mediator during the 
negotiations was also circumscribed by the Western IGOs Moreover, the tension between 
agencies themselves and unclear division of labor among them at the field level reduced the 
effectiveness of the operations (Wheeler, 2000).  
Coming to the cost of provision of humanitarian aid, the international community allocated 
about $1.4 billion for the emergency. The largest funds were coming from the usual donors; 
the US and EU, from which the 50% of the total aid was provided. (Eriksson et al., 1999). 
Dowty and Loescher point out that the total amount spent on the humanitarian relief 
operations in Rwanda within nine months following the genocide continued to be paid by 
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the traditional donors of humanitarian aid in the following periods. However, this 
instrumental mindset omits formulation of political intervention mechanisms that are 
considered to be more effective. The authors underline a vital point demonstrating the 
irrationality of the Western peace keeping mentality:  
“Focusing more attention and putting up ten to twenty million dollars early on, for 
airlifting and equipment for African peacekeepers, might have prevented much of 
the bloodletting, the physical devastation, and the mass exodus of some 2 million 
refugees from Rwanda.” (1996, p.44) 
Even if it was not costly for the international community to intervene, it was not profitable 
either. For a central African country of marginal interest for great powers, the benefits of an 
intervention would not be worthwhile of the efforts carrying the “shadow of Somalia” 
(Eriksson et al., 1999). Rwanda was regarded as a failed state in the Western eyes; 
intervention would not change anything there and produce any concrete developments (Des 
Forges, 1999). 
According to Rudolph von Bernuth (1996), another negligence of the responsible 
international actors was to involve the refugees into the decision making process. A purely 
humanitarian perspective requires that the UN agencies and ECHO should have created the 
necessary mechanisms and provide the Rwandan refugees with a platform in which they 
can express their perspectives on decisions such as repatriation.  
In particular, the European attitude towards the refugees and the general recognition rates 
were sufficient to discourage further applications. UNHCR, in a report on the Rwandese 
refugees, states that among the 19 members at the time, the number of asylum applications 
was between 1000-1,500 even a period at the height of the refugee crisis, in 1994-1997 
(UNHCR, 199872). 
Between 1990-1997, Belgium, France and Germany were the European countries that 
received the highest numbers of Rwandese asylum applications, the two-third of the whole. 
The Netherlands and Switzerland were the other destination countries for asylum seekers 
from Rwanda. However, the critical point is that, Europe had granted 2080 Rwandese 
refugee status. The figures were 1200 for Belgium, 410 for France and 120 for Italy. On the 
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other hands, 1500 asylum requests were rejected by Europe. The recognition rate was 53% 
positive decisions, which looks impressive when compared with the 11% of the rate for 
other nationalities (UNHCR, 1998). However, considering the pitifully low levels of 
applications with respect to the 3,5 million refugees, the reliability of the relatively higher 
levels of recognition rate becomes questionable.   
3.2.2. Non-Governmental Organizations 
It would be fair to infer that NGOs with the purpose of providing relief and raise awareness 
were the most effective actors during both the genocide and the ensuing refugee crisis in 
neighboring countries. Can be described as extraordinary, the NGO effort was the main 
body of the refugee protection, in the absence of political and military intervention. 
(Rudolph von Bernuth, 1996). More than 200 organizations were involved in response and 
they provided relief for numerous people. Almost 50% of the total aid were channeled 
through NGOs. And among these NGOs, 85% of this aid was provided through the 
UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP). The International Red Cross Movement 
(IRCM) contributed by 17% of the total funds to Rwanda (Eriksson et al., 1999).  
In spite of their success, scholars argue that NGOs were the most vulnerable outside actors 
during civil conflicts (Dowty and Loescher, 1996). The main vulnerability of NGOs come 
from their very nature. The reluctance of donor countries and organizations as a result of 
their own decision calculus was the main obstacle to the NGO operations. (Whitaker, 
2002).  
Presence of other conflicts mainly caused diffusion of resources, in addition to diverting 
attention. Organizations and donor countries prepared to channel their resources to the 
more “politically relevant” crises, instead of Rwanda which is behind the African shadows. 
Most countries were not willing to support the operations in the Great Lake region. This 
indirectly led to the forced repatriation since refugees were not protected in the host 
countries either (Whitaker, 2002).  
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Nevertheless, on the efficiency of NGOs during the Rwandan operation, scholars agree that 
more attention, together with an elaborate assessment could have saved human lives, more 
than expected (Eriksson et al., 1999; Rudolph von Bernuth, 1996).  
Furthermore, In Rwanda, some NGOs were reported as perpetrators of genocide since they 
were providing shelter and food for refugees who were suspected to participate in the 
genocide.  
One of the weaknesses of NGOs in developing a forceful response to the Rwandan refugee 
crisis is a chronical problem for all NGOs; inefficiency in data gathering, analysis and 
warning mechanisms. Sometimes the estimation of the number of refugees were 
miscalculated by 200,000 people. As an appalling example, during the Goma influx of 
850,000 refugees, the humanitarian assistance team was ready for only 50,000. They could 
only discover these people by physically go to the emergency areas, showing the weakness 
of the intelligence gathering mechanisms (Eriksson et al., 1999).  
The organizational structure of the UN agencies was very flexible, so that the systems were 
developed as the events come up. They did not have strictly defined responsibilities, regular 
meetings or a hierarchical relationship. This loose structure was designed to increase the 
adoptability of the organization to different contexts. However, this nature became a 
backlash during the Rwandan emergency since it was caught off-guard (Rudolph von 
Bernuth, 1996).  
As a result, one of the fundamental criticism to the NGO activity was the lack of a 
coordinator body to manage the operations. For tackling this problem, there were some 
attempts to create and NGO forum among which a coordinator body can be elected. 
However, the prevailed perception that the coordinator body would dominate and 
possibility of some misrepresentation problems prevented the establishment of such a 
forum. This failure to cooperate prepared the ground for a chaotic and disordered NGO 
structure. Inevitably, it brought competition between NGOs over the limited local 
resources, directly reducing the overall effectiveness of humanitarian operations (Rudolph 
von Bernuth, 1996). In particular, the tension between the two major NGO bodies, the 
UNHCR and WFP has a considerable backlash on the operation and shrank the scope of aid 
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provided (Eriksson et al., 1999). Only the Tanzanian case presents a successful 
coordination between the UNHCR, ECHO and USAID for developing a relatively effective 
humanitarian assistance (Rudolph von Bernuth, 1996). 
Although there was no coordinator body, some researchers pinpoint the UNHCR as a close 
candidate for the position (Eriksson et al., 1999). It had the capacity and expertise to plan, 
fund and manage the operations. However, one main problem is its presumption of the 
leader role rather than a coordinator; which ended up with exclusion of local NGOs 
(Wheeler, 2000).  
Some scholars argue that the disorder among NGOs attracted the hostility of the host 
governments. For the Rwandan refugee crisis, as mentioned earlier, the resources in the 
hands of NGOs were regarded as a troublemaker for the governments since they might 
create social unrest over the conflict between refugees and local populations. That is why, 
lack of coordination provoked government antipathy towards NGOs (Rudolph von 
Bernuth,1996).  
As a result of the aforementioned problems together with the security concerns, some 
NGOs decided to either suspend or withdraw their operations in Rwanda (Melvern, 2000). 
Some NGOs had to leave for reasons such as perpetrators of genocide being fed in the 
refugee camps; these génocidaires were keeping the refugees as hostages in the camps; no 
international action was there to support their operations and more essentially to secure 
their lives as aid personnel. It was not parallel with the norms and principles of 
humanitarian aid to leave a region of concern; however, the conditions under which the 
NGOs had to operate and their isolation as an international actor put them in an obscure 
situation that they had to withdraw. Therefore, NGOs released a statement underlining that 
camps should be screened and the genuine refugees should be differentiated from those 
inciting violence. Additionally, camps should be disarmed and their safety should be 
provided by the international forces (MSF, 199573). Otherwise, without political support of 
other actors, NGOs were vulnerable to further become a tool for either rebel groups or 
states to reach realization of interests.  
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One aspect of the state antipathy towards the NGOs is related with human rights 
monitoring and naming-shaming capabilities of these organizations. Some NGOs made 
certain states uncomfortable. One clear instance is the attitude of Zaire’s President Kabila 
towards the UNHCR investigation on massacres of refugees. The government, risking the 
lives of hundreds of refugees, repatriated the Rwandese in order to disrupt the 
investigations; which was thought to be an internationally planned conspiracy against 
President Kabila’s state. However, he successfully used human rights concerns of NGOs 
that UNHCR announced it terminated the investigation in Zaire and withdrawn to prevent 
forced repatriation of further refugees (UNHCR, 199874). 
The Cessation Clauses 
The UNHCR, in a joint operation with the Tanzanian government, announced that the 
deadline for the refugees to return Rwanda was December 1996. UNHCR even funded the 
process of repatriation and also supported the operation with logistical help; it informed the 
refugees about the repatriation process. It provided the Tanzanian government with the 
necessary funds of 1.5 million dollars, required for the additional equipment and personnel 
for the operation. And the operation was successful; at the end of December 1996, 400,000 
Rwandans were expelled from Tanzania through Ngara (Whitaker, 2002).  
Jessica Rodger (2001) suggest that the UNHCR involvement in the repatriation process was 
a trigger for other countries in the region to follow the same path and expel refugees. As the 
organization employed to guard refugee rights and protection, the UNHCR even supported 
the repatriation process, violating the principle of non-refoulement. As another ‘bow to 
realities’ (Whitaker, 2002), the organization preferred a monitored repatriation rather than 
letting the states proceed without supervision; at the expense of its norms and principles 
(Rodger, 2001).  
The process cannot be defined as “voluntary repatriation” (Rodger, 2001; Whitaker 2002); 
however almost all international and state level actors were silent about the process. The 
context-dependent and pragmatic humanitarianism of the actors prevented them from 
abiding with the norms and principles they firmly supported. This strategic approach on 
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humanitarian relief with the support of the UNHCR eased the feeling of guilt; since all 
refugees were home now. The Rwandan government, very supportive of repatriation, was 
contented with the situation (Hovil, 2010).  
Although the world mostly did not pay attention in general, the attitude of the UNHCR as 
heavily criticized by some NGOs. The Amnesty International regarded it as “a shocking 
disregard for the rights, dignity and safety of refugees” and the Human Rights Watch 
accused the Organization of having “shamefully abandoned its responsibility to protect 
refugees” with the joint operation of the Cessation Clause (Whitaker, 2002). Crispy, 
similarly, describes the impact of the decision on the reputation of the agency as “the worst 
such event in the UNHCR history” (1998; quoted from Roberts, 1998, p.387). 
Hovil diagnoses the behavior change of the UNHCR as a shift from facilitating repatriation 
to promoting return actively. The point that UNHCR is accused of being irresponsible is its 
continuing ignorance about the accumulated experience and data on conflict reoccurrence 
patterns. The literature almost unanimously agrees on the argument that the cyclical pattern 
of conflicts is triggered with the forced repatriation; increasing the regional security threats 
(2010).  
Some scholars explain the logic behind the instrumental humanitarianism chosen by the 
UNHCR by referring to forced repatriation as a conflict prevention method and hence 
understandable. The claim is that responsibility to prevent is a higher priority than the 
responsibility to protect. And since prolonged asylum cases are known to threaten regional 
security, organizations should “make the difficult choice” (Whitaker, 2002) and opt for 
forced repatriation. This ostensible prevention happens to be a very useful tool for states as 
an explanation for their human rights violations. In this case, repatriation is described as 
“early” rather than “forced” (Ogata, 1997). All violations of responsibility to protect and 
non-refoulement principles can be excused with this line of reasoning. Last but not least, 
possible conflicts as a result of the forced repatriation are not taken into consideration at all.  
Regarding the situation as “renunciation of principle of realpolitik”, Fennel highlights an 
important point of human rights and questions whether or not NGOs and IGOs, together 
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with donor countries, would abandon long term goals of peace and stability for the short 
term benefits:  
The absolute values of international humanitarian law would now seem to be 
largely replaced by relative ‘conflict management’ objectives designed to achieve a 
strategically or economically favorable peace” (Fennell, 1997, p.7). 
Refugees and repatriation 
The dilemma of repatriation was the fact that the individuals with continuing fear of 
prosecution were the ones who engaged in genocide and hence they were seeking asylum. 
The organizations that opposed to the forced repatriations were labeled as supporters of the 
génocidaires, creating an ethical conundrum (Whitaker, 2002).  
This repatriation puzzle paved created a picture in which the genuine refugees were sent 
back home; who were Hutus and still suspected by the local Tutsi population having the 
political upper hand in the country.  On the other hand, the real génocidaires who confessed 
were separated in prisons of the host countries and received protection somehow. 
Interesting enough, this normatively beleaguered operation was protected by the UNHCR. 
Moreover, the repatriations of the genuine refugees were conducted without considering the 
situation in Rwanda for Hutus. It was clearly disregarded when the Amnesty International 
warned the governments and the international community about the deficiencies of refugee 
protection mechanisms particularly for Hutu population, the possibility of human rights 
violations, outbreak of violence in Rwanda (Rodger, 2001). In an unpublished UN report, it 
is claimed that in 1994 RPF had killed a high number of Rwandan people, presumably 
Hutus, after the genocide about 25,000 to 40,000 (Des Forges, 1999.) Considering this kind 
of tendencies that the current government had, the repatriation decision of the old enemy 
Hutus to Rwanda may result in problematic situations in terms of human rights. 
The responsible parties for the protection of refugees clearly neglected to question the 
reason and concerns of Rwandese refugees that prevent them from returning home, despite 
all the efforts of UNHCR and Rwandan government. Indeed, these are the genuine 
concerns that raise the need for protection and intervention so that many refugees feel a 
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constant fear and hide from authorities in order not to be detected and returned (Hovil, 
2010). 
First of all, in order for repatriation to take place, the return to the country of origin Rwanda 
should be in safety, dignity and security according to the UNHCR (1996) description75. Set 
aside dignity, the condition for return in safety is defined as followed: 
Return which takes place under conditions of legal safety (such as amnesties or 
public assurances of personal safety, integrity, non-discrimination and freedom 
from fear of persecution or punishment upon return), physical security (including 
protection from armed attacks, and mine-free routes and if not mine-free then at 
least demarcated settlement sites), and material security (access to land or means of 
livelihood) (ibid). 
The conclusions of Hovil’s research by interviewing 102 Hutu refugees on their perception 
on repatriation clearly demonstrate the fact that the refugees are really afraid of their 
security in Rwanda. At the time of study, 2010, the number of refugees applying to Uganda 
was 1,312 which demonstrates the continued need for asylum even after sixteen years after 
the genocide. Mostly, refugees think that the government is suppressing the Hutus 
revengefully and they will face human rights abuses back home. The ethnic polarization 
still considered to be present and the Hutu refugees abstain from holding responsible for the 
legacy of genocide (2010). 
Mostly feared is the local tribunals established for hearing the genocide suspects called 
gacaca courts. Although the courts are operational for securing justice and reaching public 
relief; it might become highly manipulated by personal grievances and end up with 
sentencing even the genuine refugees (ICAR, 2004). 
Second problematic part of repatriation is another local mechanism called ibuka, meaning 
remembrance. Designed for the victims of genocide, the ibuka process is regarded as a way 
to repress the presumed génocidaires and develop anti-Hutu biases. This traditionalized 
practice in April, the time of genocide, aims at creation of a collective guilt among the 
Hutus; by, for instance, only mourning for the Tutsi deaths, excluding the losses from 
moderate Hutus. Even practices such as making Hutus wash the bones of Tutsis puts 
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serious pressure on the people and promotes the anti-Hutu stereotypes. Moreover, the 
exclusion of Hutus by attributing collective guilt result in legitimation of re-accessing the 
property of these people. To put it simple words, the Hutus refugees cannot claim their 
property; even if they risk their lives and decide to return. With the current government 
continuing oppression and the UNHCR, the only international body involved, supporting 
the government’s ambitions; Rwandans outside Rwanda are scared to return (Hovil, 2010). 
The Current Situation 
Despite all the aforementioned concerns, the UNHCR adopted itself to the realpolitik by 
declaring another Cessation Clause in 2009 and 2013, for the refugees who fled the country 
before 1999. The official claim was that the refugees had no longer a reason to be exposed 
violence and a reasonable fear of persecution was waiting them back home. From this point 
on, according to UNHCR reports, Rwandese refugees, will not be able to hold the refugee 
status and will become stateless persons (UNHCR, 2015; Nyange, 201376) 
Today, according to the UNHCR data, there are 100,000 refugees left in eleven host 
countries which are Burundi, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, South 
Africa, Malawi, Angola, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Zambia. In a ministerial 
meeting in 2015, all the mentioned countries, the country of origin Rwanda and related 
organizations have come together for these refugees of concern for the international 
community, and agreed on putting the deadline of 31 December 2016 for return for the 
100,000 people in question. After this point, at the end of 2017, the UNHCR will keep its 
hands off from the refugee protection operations for the Rwandan people. Then, only the 
convention refugees will be protected by the host governments; the rest will be 
“voluntarily” repatriated, which is the most preferred option (UNHCR, 2015).  
Although the Cessation Clause in 2013 announces that the individuals who are able to 
demonstrate that they still have the reasonable security concerns for not to return are able to 
ask for refugee status, it does not satisfy the refugees who have fear of prosecution. Most 
obviously, Rwanda ranks 135 among the 162 states in the Global Peace Index at the time of 
latest Clause, in 2013 (Estes, 2014). The reason is that most countries recently reject 
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Rwandan applications; hence refugees have still lower levels of confidence in the process 
and refuse to return (Hovil, 2010).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 CASE COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 
 
After the in depth study of the two civil wars and the refugee crises afterwards, this final 
chapter focuses on the comparative analysis of the two cases. The general conclusion of the 
two case analysis is in parallel with the findings of the realist school; states are the main 
actors of the response to the even humanitarian cases such as refugee flows. The most 
important demonstrator of state centrality of the responses is the absence of an 
internationally uniform recognition or definition of refugee/asylum/protection status. No 
holistic law can be applied as a result of individual states demanding to follow their own 
interests. 
Actors other than the states are considered to be capable of knowledge construction, 
lobbying, campaigning and compliance monitoring. With the ability of international 
organizations on naming and shaming, they have the capacity to be a deterring actor for 
refusing to provide international protection for refugees; however, it is mostly obstructed 
by the power configuration of states at the political level. NGOs on the other hand, are 
better only in raising awareness and campaigning for the humanitarian relief operations 
since they are mostly dependent on state actors politically and financially.  
The below analysis is on the determinants of the actor responses to the refugee crisis upon 
the overview of the Syrian and Rwandan cases. Unlike the previous chapters, the structure 
of this chapter is not designed to have subcategories that differentiate state level actors from 
international actors since the intertwined nature of the two levels of analysis has become 
apparent with studying the two cases. Thus, this chapter jointly evaluates the various actors 
involved in the responses to the refugee crises. 
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1. The magnitude of the crisis 
Figure 3. Forcibly Displaced People in the World 
 
To begin with, as demonstrated in the above graph, the magnitude of the two crisis is 
phenomenal in that these are the crises that produced highest number of refugees and 
displaced largest scale of people. The two crisis are figuratively similar in that the 
proportion of population fleeing the country to the pre-war population is approximate. In 
both cases, more than half of the population had to displace either internally or to another 
state. On top of this, the period during which the two crises took place was the times that 
the world was experiencing highest number of people of concern in total. In 1990s, the 
number of refugees was 17 million whereas 26 million people were IDPs all around the 
world (Cross, 2001). Today in 2016, the number of refugees is 21.3 million whereas the 
IDPs constitute 44 million of the world’s population (UNHCR, 201677). 
In this manner, scholars conclude that the magnitude is also a demonstrator of the level of 
violence; the more war gets violent, the more people decide to flee the country. In the 
words of Weiss and Korn “The most reliable indicator of suffering in war zones is usually 
the number of ‘refugees” (2006, p.1). Hence the number of refugees also demonstrates the 
intensity of the conflict, together with the duration of war.  
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As the number of refugees increases, the perception of threat in the eyes of various actors 
also raises correspondingly (Dowty and Loescher, 1996). However, the Rwandan case 
demonstrated that this line of reasoning does not apply to the crisis that do not produce a 
‘credible threat’ for the state or IGO. In the Rwandan case, actors that responded most 
actively to the crisis was NGOs. IGOs and state level actors remained relatively silent no 
matter what the magnitude of the crisis war. That signifies that some intervening factors 
may double the impact of the large magnitude; similar to what is observed to be the case in 
Syria.  
 
2. Geographical Proximity  
An important factor that influenced actor responses was geographical proximity of the 
conflict to the powerful actors. Rwanda was a central African country far from Europe and 
Americas; the refugee crisis and a possible spillover effect was not a big threat for the 
actors; thus they remained passive to develop a response for the humanitarian suffering. 
However, Syria, is close enough to the Western powers that the probability of spillover 
through refugees becomes very high; together with the large magnitude of the crisis, 
powerful state and international level actors perceive the Syrian refugee crisis as a credible 
threat to their security. Inevitably, they perceived the necessity to interfere somehow that 
the crisis does not grow further. The geographical proximity factor is closely related with 
the next item; previous conflicts. In fact, without geographical proximity, presence of 
previous conflicts may exacerbate the human suffering whereas the response may change 
when the  
3. Previous Conflicts 
The analysis of the two exoduses revealed that previous conflicts in the region which 
caused mass migration are fundamental hampering factors for actors to involve. This item 
applies to the both international and state level actors. When we look at the Rwandan case, 
the previous refugee crisis in fact is the main trigger for the genocide and the influx 
aftermath.  The refugees in-exile for three decades between 1960-1990 are the builders of 
what happened in Rwanda (Van der Meeren, 1996). Also the previous crisis in Somalia and 
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the intervention to it by the UN Security Council had detrimental impact on the approach of 
the international community to the Rwandan conflict as well as refugees. The existence of a 
previous conflict increases the reluctance of actors to involve in cases where they see 
marginal interest (Eriksson et al., 1996).  
Coming to the Syrian crisis, the situation is conspicuous when we look at the below graph 
by the UNHCR, demonstrating the variety of refugees fleeing from Middle Eastern and 
African countries. Afghanistan, being the next perilous one, Somalia and South Sudan.  
 
Figure 4. Refugees by Country of Origin 
  
Source: UNHCR, Economist 
 
For the both cases, the intervention to previous conflicts was also central to the formulation 
of response by actors, particularly international organizations. IGOs such as the EU and UN 
were in a political gridlock since the member states were highly reluctant to intervene 
because of the recent failures. Constituencies of the governments of member states were 
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critical about the past interventions in the Middle East, this prevented further involvements 
in third country conflicts. The IGOS, on the other hand, are sensitive to miscalculated 
interventions which may result with failure; since these mistakes further discredit the 
organization and damage its future operations. However, when the geographical component 
is in the picture; a highly proximate large-scaled refugee crisis is itself sufficient to urge the 
relevant actors to involve. With the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU and individual European 
states find themselves in a situation that they had no choice but respond somehow. The 
abruptness and scale of the Syrian refugee crisis has no precedent in the European history. 
That is why, European perception has not been clear about the length of stay (Heisbourg, 
2015). The tendency of states to free ride still exists and is observed; but the magnitude of 
human suffering put a high pressure on the Union in general.  
However, the situation is different for the international NGOs; existence of a previous 
conflict is operationally helpful since the organization has more information and know-how 
on the field. Thereby, they can become more reactive to the crisis than IGOs; which was the 
case in Rwanda. But for the both Syrian and Rwandan cases, the lack of political support 
for resolution and the power vacuum led to emergence of militarization of non-state actors 
such as the IS for Syria or RPF for Rwanda. These actors are the main inhibiters of NGO 
operations in the field. In both cases, the security of lives of the NGO personnel was in 
such a danger that they had to suspend or cancel their operations.  
4. Refugee type, profile and motivation 
The refugee type is closely related with the previous conflict, if exists, and the aftermath of 
it since the refugees are generally mixed into the previous refugees. The refugee profile; 
meaning the ethnic variety, educational background or political tendencies of the fleeing 
population. When making the decision on asylum applications, the state logic applies that 
aim to take advantage of the humanitarian situation so that it can turn the influx into its 
good account (Lischer, 2005).  
For the Syrian exodus, the state responses are mostly dependent on this factor. Elaborate 
analyses of the Syrian refugee profile conclude that the displaced population from the 
Syrian Arab Republic is more skilled than the refugee groups from other countries of origin 
   
99 
 
such as Afghanistan or Somalia. The level of skilled labor is considerably high; and the 
educational and professional profile of the refugees are appropriate for operationalizing in 
various fields (Dumont and Scarpetta, 2015). These figures are closely evaluated by the 
state authorities and IGOs when preparing the pool of qualified refugees to be appraised.  
Canada is the country that applies this logic; since Canada is geographically distant from 
the region and is not affected from the instant outflow. As the Conference Board of Canada 
research associate Kareem El-Assal puts in his words; “Indeed, in the absence of high 
immigration levels, Canada’s population will shrink, our economy will suffer, and our 
standard of living will decline”78. He claims that the economy of Canada, indeed, needs the 
Syrian refugees who are selected by the UN from the tool of refugees in Turkey, Lebanon 
and Jordan. According to his analysis, tot only revitalizing the Canadian economy, the 
Syrians will contribute to the demographics of the country with the younger population.  
It is similar with Germany that the asylum procedure was designed to accept more qualified 
refugees. The prioritized applications were among the one who can be ‘Syrian 
reconstructions’; those who has high skills and can speak German, for instance. Needless to 
mention, the refugees endowed with the capability to rebuild Syria in the future, will be 
more preferred to be grant the refugee status. The raison d’état applies one more time that 
states aim to benefit from humanitarian assistance as well.   
Also the Turkish President’s recent explanations is parallel to this line of reasoning when 
he announced the plan to accept Syrians as citizens of Turkish Republic. Erdogan clearly 
stated in his words; "Some of them are very qualified -- and if we don't accept them they 
will leave for Europe, for Britain and Canada79". With the aim of promoting Turkey as a 
destination country, the government aims to participate the competition between states such 
as Canada or the US over qualified migrants to be utilized in various fields.  
On the other hand, the refugee profile and motivation may be an obstruction as well. Here, 
similar to the Rwandan refugee warriors (Zolberg, 1979) argument that made Tanzania and 
Zaire to reject refugees fearing instability and escalation of violence, the Syrian refugees 
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face the suspicion of being the IS terrorist trying to leak to the host country for a terrorist 
operation. As Lischer argued (2005), states make a probability assessment of refugees to 
become militarized within their territory. In this manner, the involvement of the IS in the 
conflict and the extremism of its plans and actions somehow label the Syrians as the 
possible threat since they are coming from the same region and religion.  
5. Cultural - Traditional Proximity  
The ethnic, cultural and religious identity of refugees and the state perspective to it is 
highly influential in shaping the state responses. Although it is not the only factor for state 
decisions, this proximity may work twofold by either inciting fear and security concerns as 
well as sympathy and welcoming towards refugees depending on the context.  
As an example from the situations in the Syrian case that some states perceive the fleeing 
population as a threat to their security and thus respond accordingly. As a part of this 
analysis, Hungarian state perceived the crisis as an existential threat and formulated their 
response accordingly. The Hungarian Prime Minister in an opinion piece wrote that:  
Let us not forget, however, that those arriving have been raised in another religion, 
and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but 
Muslims. This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is 
rooted in Christianity. Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now 
barely able to keep Europe Christian? If we lose sight of this, the idea of Europe 
could become a minority interest in its own continent80. 
Coming to the situation in Rwanda, a pull factor for refugees in host countries was the 
facilitating impacts of transmigration being prevalent in the region.  With the existing 
ethnic ties in the countries such as Tanzania or Uganda, refugees were able to find a livable 
environment even as a refugee or asylum seeker, so that they preferred living abroad to 
repatriate. If the refugee warrior situation and security threat were not present; the state 
perception of the neighbors was more welcoming to the people from a similar ethnic and 
cultural background (Eriksson et al., 1999).  
French on the other hand, supported the refugee camps but provided selective protection as 
the realists claim; since the aim was only continue its existence and legitimacy in the region 
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(Whitaker, 2002). The case of French operation was a clear demonstrator of the realist 
claim that humanitarian intervention can take the shape of a weapon pointed at the most 
vulnerable (Franck and Rodley, 1973). The same goes for Tanzania; they just wanted to 
secure their borders and did not have the necessary means. Therefore, they had to refoul the 
refugees by using force; which was a voluntary repatriation only in paper and politicians’ 
rhetoric (Rodger, 2001).  
6. The foreign policy positioning of the sender country 
As explained in the literature review chapter, some scholars claim that the response of a 
state to an influx may depend on the foreign policy positioning of the sender country in the 
eyes of the host country (Saleyhan, 2014; also similar Whitaker, 2002). One application of 
Saleyhan’s theory is observed which is fundamentally significant for the main claim of this 
thesis: Iran, which did not accept any refugees fleeing from the Syrian civil war (UNHCR, 
201681). This case is critical for the analysis of Syrian crisis since it emphasizes the priority 
of political aspect of the response to the other factors listed above. Having the geographical 
and religious proximity conditions met, the Iranian state still does not accept any Syrian 
refugees. The claim of this thesis is that the foreign policy positioning of the country 
mainly shapes the response; Iran clearly support the Assad regime. Accepting refugees, 
even one, would mean to discredit the Syrian incumbent and undermine the Iranian foreign 
policy making. Very similar argument follows for Russia as well. As an international ally 
of the sender country, Russia cannot accept refugees which would cause its policies to lose 
face in the international and domestic grounds.  
Canada, on the other hand, is another example of the argument. The Canadian government 
followed a policy against the incumbent government of Syria, as it started to accept 
refugees. The government further holds the Assad government, “a state sponsor of 
terrorism”, responsible for the emergence of the IS in the region. As the Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Bob Nicholson states officially:  
President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal actions against his own citizens have resulted in 
a downward spiral of violence and extremism and a humanitarian crisis of appalling 
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dimensions—and created the fertile conditions for the so-called Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant to grow. Canada condemns in the strongest terms the Assad 
regime’s continued assaults on citizens… We remain determined that the Assad 
regime will also be held to account for its crimes against the people of Syria82. 
The argument also works for the refugee acceptance policies of Turkey, Germany and the 
EU in general and their stance against the Syrian regime. Not surprisingly, the country that 
accepted the largest number of refugees, Turkey, maintains a firm opposition to Assad and 
his rule since the outbreak of the war. Moreover, the Turkish government supports the 
insurgency movement against Syrian regime to further support the Turkish stance 
domestically.  
The EU, as an IGO, adopts a policy position parallel to the Saleyhan’s argument by 
condemning the Syrian regime to be responsible for the refugee-generating conflict. As 
Catherine Ashton, EU foreign policy chief, officially states; The EU notes the complete 
loss of Bashar al-Assad's legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people and the necessity for 
him to step aside" 83 . The European states, together with Canada, announced a joint 
statement against Assad urging him to leave office and put an end to the conflict and 
refugee exodus.  
For the argument of foreign policy positioning influencing the asylum decision (Saleyhan, 
2014), one exception is observed however with a probable explanation: Israel. As a country 
known with exceptionalities, Israel is the state in the region that have not taken any 
refugees, even if it has borders with Syria (UNHCR, 20156). The long history of Syrian 
hostility was not triggering enough to make Israel consider accepting refugee applications 
in order to discredit the Syrian government in the international arena. However, the logic of 
this line of Israeli policy making is surprising, taking its general foreign policy making into 
consideration. A massive influx from an Arab country would not be highly welcomed in 
Israel, both politically and socially.  In fact, it is reciprocal; on the other side of the coin, 
most Syrians would not rank Israel, the proverbial enemy of Arabs, as the top choice for 
seeking asylum.  
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7. Spillover of Conflict 
Whitaker (2003) has analyzed refugee flows that led to outbreak of conflict in the host state 
and came up with certain conditions related with refugees that prepare the ground for 
emergence of violence. One of her case studies is the Rwandan civil war in 1994; hence her 
findings apply to the Rwandan case. For the purposes of this thesis, another conclusion can 
be drawn for the Syrian case by following the footsteps of her analysis.  
First of all, she hypothesizes that when a failed or deteriorating state is exposed to a refugee 
influx, there is a higher possibility of conflict to outbreak. The description of failed state, 
according to Dowty and Loescher is  
… when a state ceases to be a state, conceding to the international community not 
only the right but also the duty to intervene. Clearly, the sudden flight of large 
populations is itself one sign that a government is no longer functioning effectively 
(1996, p.60).  
In the Rwandan case of their analysis, the failed state was Zaire, which was a highly weak 
government and the result was reescalation of violence. For the Syrian case, the host 
country which is most vulnerable to this possibility is Lebanon with its overwhelmed 
refugee population on top of the domestic instabilities and weak political infrastructure. 
Lebanon has the world’s highest refugee per capita number. Politically speaking, since May 
2014, the country has not had a president. coming to the parliament and government, the 
political paralysis did not allow passing a budget since 2005. Not surprisingly, the economy 
and savings are exhausted and the labor market is on the brink of collapse (UNHCR, 
201584). This chaos is further messed up with the influx of Syrian refugees. The country has 
experienced a garbage crisis which brought the turmoil into the light. The statement of 
Lebanese Prime Minister upon this crisis is vital for understanding the current situation in 
Lebanon: "I warn we are moving towards collapse if matters continue. A bigger problem 
than the trash crisis was Lebanon's ‘political garbage’”85. Considering the fact that almost 
one third of the country’s population support Hezbollah and the IS terror in the region 
benefiting from the power vacuum; the ground gets highly suitable for Whitaker’s 
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correlation between refugee influxes to failed states and possibility of conflict to be highly 
probable (2013). 
The second condition for escalation of violence in the host country is the case that when 
refugee-generating conflict is linked with ethnic polarization. The Rwandan conflict is an 
ethnic conflict in itself; and the level of ethnic politization is so high that the neighborhood 
was influenced with the repercussions and violence was triggered. For the Syrian case, 
similarly, the conflict has ethnic dimensions. Considering the fact that the ethnosectraian 
division of Alawite-Sunni-Salafi frictions are parallel in most Muslim countries in the 
region hosting the Syrians, such as Lebanon, Jordan or Turkey. With the IS and its violence 
centralizing around the extreme Salafism, the picture gets more complicated. According to 
Whitaker’s diagnosis (2003) on the conditions inciting violence in the hosts, the ethnic 
identity of the Syrian conflict has the probability to trigger further conflicts in the Middle 
East. 
The third condition for impact of influxes on the breakout of violence is the case that the 
leaders host country decide to take advantage of refugees for his/her own pursuit of interest 
and power raising. Applying it to the Rwandan case, the Zairian President Mobutu, who 
aimed to “play political games” with the refugees in his territory, supported the refugees 
who were mostly génocidaires. His hope was regaining power against the political reform 
in his country. However, the conflict escalated and RPF attacked Zaire against Mobutu’s 
plans; the result was slaughter of hundreds of refugees being. A similar logic can be applied 
to the Turkish case that refugee issue has been used as a political leverage during the 
negotiations between the EU and Germany. The Turkish government, as a foreign policy 
success, used the opportunity to revitalize the accession talks; on top of the promise for visa 
liberalization. Additionally, Murat Erdogan, a migration expert in Turkey, claims that 
Turkish authorities may have the intention to convert the Syrian refugee issue to a political 
leverage for the domestic arena by granting citizenship to the refugees86, which is a recent 
promise from President Erdogan87.  
                                                          
86 Nokta Magazine, "AK Parti, Suriyeli mültecileri siyasi koza dönüştürebilir” 
87 Aljazeera. “Erdogan: Syrian refugees could become Turkish citizens”.  
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Taking Whitaker’s third condition one step further, the utilization of refugees by groups 
other than state actors also can be of concern. As mentioned earlier, insurgent organizations 
such as RPF in the Rwandan case or IS in the Syrian case can take advantage of the 
refugees and trigger further violence. That is why, for instance, when Syrians are resettled 
as refugees in other countries, the IS was annoyed since it was cut from an important 
financial line coming from these people. In this manner, the IS acts firmly against the 
Syrians fleeing the country and resettling in other countries88.  
All in all, mostly state actor responses against the refugee resettlement is claimed to be 
security related. Nation states clearly assert that the probability of a Syrian refugee to have 
extremist purposes is very high; hence states refuse to accept the asylum requests coming 
from the region for protecting their nation from the risk of terrorism. However, this line of 
reasoning by securitizing refugees misses what the study of conflicts and migration teaches; 
the longer refugees suffer the more extremist they become, living under inhumane 
conditions without protection. Radicalization of refugees is a golden opportunity for 
terrorist organizations to exploit and operationalize these vulnerable people as assets who 
can be possessed easily and cheaply. Sometimes, even the hope that refugees are given is 
sufficient to convince them to participate in radical activities89.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
88 Global News Canada, “Should Canada stop bringing in Syrian refugees because of the Paris attacks? Experts say no.” 
89 NYT, “How Dragging Our Feet on Refugees Creates More Terrorists”. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The emerging literature on the relation between refugee flows and onset of international 
war is an aspect that makes this thesis essential. Saleyhan (2007) examines the militarized 
interstate disputes(MIDs) between 1955-2000 and conducts a quantitative analysis of the 
impact of refugee migration. His results demonstrate statistically significant impacts of 
refugee influx on triggering interstate fights (p.26).  
Saleyhan’s conclusions are central to this thesis in that it points out the fact that actors’ 
responses to the refugee flows may possibly reach to the level of armed conflict. Regarding 
the uprooted population as the “Negative Externalities of Civil Strife” (Saleyhan, 2007), he 
concludes that the probability of an exodus to a second country to increase preexisting 
tensions between the sender and receiver country or emerge new conflicts is very high. 
That additional factor underscores the significance of refugee movements and academic 
study of massive influxes.  
For now, the global trend shows that refugee flight, international protection and conflict are 
going to sustain their positions as the hottest issues of the world’s agenda. Massive 
migration does not seem to disappear in the near future. The aim of this thesis is to come up 
with new dimensions to the study of conflicts and international organizations so that the 
essentiality of the politics underlined for developing responses to humanitarian suffering. 
Charity and financial aid is necessary but insufficient for handling crises of this magnitude 
(Dowty and Loescher, 1996).  
Hence, this study aims to contribute to the future research that should focus on the 
systematic obstacles to development of political responses by various actors to the effort of 
humanitarian assistance. One fundamental expansion of the question of this research would 
be, obviously, to test the hypotheses of the thesis by using more quantifiable data that 
should feed the conclusions of process tracing in case study analysis.  
This thesis also another support for the study of correlates and causes of conflicts and wars. 
By looking into the actors’ responses to the refugee crises, this thesis revealed the level of 
insufficiency that all relevant actors and the international system to formulate an effective 
response. If states and organizations, for the reasons studied in this thesis or any other, are 
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not capable of ameliorating the human suffering aftermath of crises; then the focus should 
be on prevention of conflict rather than rehabilitate or reconcile (Dowty and Loescher, 
1996).   
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Table 1. UNHCR Resettlement and Other Admission Pathways for Syrian Refugees as 
of 29 April 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
123 
 
Table 2. Total Asylum Applications to Europe: derived from EUROSTAT 
GEO/TIME 2011  
Asylum 
Applications 
2012 
Asylum 
Applications 
2013 
Asylum 
Applications 
2014 
Asylum 
Applications 
2015 
Asylum 
Applications 
2016- 
(until June) 
Asylum 
Applications 
Total  
Asylum  
Applications 
(June 2016) 
European 
Union 
(28 countries) 
6,450 20,810 46,460 119,005 362,775 153,640 709,140 
Belgium 460 815 975 2,630 10,290 1,100 16,270 
Bulgaria 70 430 4,445 6,205 5,945 585 17,680 
Czech 
Republic 
0 60 75 100 130 15 380 
Denmark 460 880 1,675 7,205 8,580 790 19,590 
Germany  2,630 6,205 11,845 39,335 158,665 135,855 354,535 
Estonia 0 5 10 10 10 0 35 
Ireland 5 5 30 20 70 30 160 
Greece 350 275 465 735 3,320 1,880 7,025 
Spain 90 225 715 1,495 5,720 330 8,575 
France 115 615 1,305 2,830 4,625 1,100 10,590 
Croatia 0 0 195 65 20 20 300 
Italy 540 360 635 510 505 330 2,880 
Cyprus 190 505 460 755 915 275 3,100 
Latvia 15 15 10 35 5 15 95 
Lithuania 0 0 0 5 5 5 15 
Luxembourg 10 5 25 90 630 110 870 
Hungary 0 0 930 6,630 64,075 2,445 74,080 
Malta 120 140 250 305 395 90 1,300 
Netherlands 170 460 2,235 8,750 18,635 1,265 31,515 
Austria 0 0 0 7,655 24,725 3,870 36,250 
Poland 10 105 260 105 295 30 805 
Portugal 0 20 140 5 10 5 180 
Romania 30 230 965 585 550 50 2,410 
Slovenia 5 35 50 95 15 150 350 
Slovakia 5 0 10 30 0 0 45 
Finland 0 180 155 145 875 190 1,545 
Sweden 635 7,915 16,540 30,310 50,890 2,615 108,905 
United 
Kingdom 
505 1,290 2,010 2,350 2,840 490 9,485 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 10 15 25 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 180 315 855 1,990 10,535 240 14,115 
Switzerland 690 1,150 1,850 3,775 4,655 1,050 13,170 
Serbia * * * * * * 313,445 
Total 7,330 22,260 49,155 124,740 377,980 154,940 1,049,850 
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Table 3. Total Asylum Granted by Europe: derived from EUROSTAT 
GEO/TIME 2011 
Asylum  
Granted 
2012 
Asylum  
Granted 
2013 
Asylum  
Granted 
2014 
Asylum  
Granted 
2015 
Asylum  
Granted 
Total  
Asylum  
Granted 
European Union 
(28 countries) 
1,675 16,165 32,615 68,655 162,090 281,200 
Belgium 65 595 1,535 1,675 3,670 7,540 
Bulgaria 5 55 2,005 6,405 5,320 13,790 
Czech Republic 0 10 105 75 130 320 
Denmark 360 680 1,295 3,985 5,705 12,025 
Germany  430 7,465 8,700 23,860 101,415 141,870 
Estonia 0 0 0 5 0 5 
Ireland 0 15 40 25 25 105 
Greece 5 0 105 590 2,795 3,495 
Spain 0 0 150 1,160 655 1,965 
France 40 340 1,195 1,950 3,110 6,635 
Croatia : 10 10 0 0 20 
Italy 65 200 395 315 330 1,305 
Cyprus 0 5 120 930 1,390 2,445 
Latvia 5 15 15 20 15 70 
Lithuania 0 0 10 0 5 15 
Luxembourg 0 5 10 40 80 135 
Hungary 5 45 130 180 160 520 
Malta 50 115 270 360 270 1,065 
Netherlands 25 585 1,695 5,440 7,850 15,595 
Austria 300 740 935 3,205 7,940 13,120 
Poland 0 5 85 130 205 425 
Portugal 0 0 15 0 0 15 
Romania 0 120 785 460 335 1,700 
Slovenia 0 0 5 10 10 25 
Slovakia 0 0 10 15 10 35 
Finland 30 145 145 100 135 555 
Sweden 145 4,090 11,390 16,295 18,470 50,390 
United Kingdom 150 920 1,455 1,425 2,055 6,005 
Iceland 0 0 5 5 15 25 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 10 245 690 1,250 1,550 3,745 
Switzerland 550 415 730 3,650 3,385 8,730 
Serbia * * * * * 0 
Total 2,235 16,825 34,040 73,555 167,040 293,695 
 
